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INTRODUCTION
New technology has made copyright enforcement difficult to
1
achieve. Technology has made it possible to transmit, reproduce, and
obtain copyrighted materials around the globe without great monetary
investment. The Internet and digital technology allow users from
different countries to share and obtain music, movies, or other protected
works without even knowing where the source of the copyrighted
material is located. On the other hand, satellite technology brings
another problem: foreign users may obtain satellite signals without
authorization. As technology becomes more sophisticated and easy to
use, copyright holders may need the aid of more efficient enforcement
procedures to be able to stop infringement abroad, including protecting
themselves even in countries where the activity is not otherwise
considered an infringement of rights.
Existing international copyright litigation practices were crafted in
the analog age. A new set of problems are now afoot. Copyright
holders face an entirely different sort of scenario when, for example,
they must try to quell infringement in a situation in which the copy is of
exactly the same quality as the original as opposed to when they just had
to focus on impeding the diffusion of low quality copies or subsequent
transmissions. In the latter situation, the mere fact that each generation
of copies lost quality, as compared to the source, served as an essential
and inherent protection mechanism that now largely no longer exists.
At the international level, copyright holders are fighting a battle in
which they hold nothing more than antique guns while they are pitted
against the most modern and sophisticated artillery. This does not mean
2
that all existing international conventions are useless. On the contrary,
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property

1. See Graeme W. Austin, Domestic Laws and Foreign Rights: Choice of Law in
Transnational Copyright Infringement Litigation, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1, 3 (1999).
2. Professor Gervais defines four stages of development of international copyright
conventions: the pre-1883 bilateral phase; the 1883–1971 BIRPI phase (so named for the
Bureaux Internationaux Réunis pour la Protection de la Propriété Intellectuelle under which
the Paris and Berne Conventions were administered); the 1971–1994 TRIPs phase, which
included the signing of the 1971 Paris Act of the Berne Convention and the negotiation of the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights; and the now current,
post-1994 paradigmatic phase in which new technologies have new challenges. Daniel J.
Gervais, The Internationalization of Intellectual Property: New Challenges from the Very Old
and the Very New, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 929 (2002). While I
agree with the designation of those phases, I think that the new challenges are about
enforcement procedures, rather than traditional knowledge, as Professor Gervais suggests.
See id. at 933.
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Rights (TRIPs Agreement) has achieved impressive accomplishments in
3
harmonizing and setting minimum rights around the world. In other
words, in order to enforce copyrights efficiently, only a modest step is
needed. There is a need for an international mechanism for the
4
enforcement of existing rights. Just as it has become easier to infringe
upon copyrights, it must become easier to enforce copyrights as well.
This is the impetus for this Article; what follows is a proposal for a
mechanism for international copyright litigation.
The proposed mechanism is the next needed development in
international copyright law. History has shown that technological
developments are followed by changes in the copyright law in an
attempt to solve the new problems technology creates for copyright
5
holders.
But the problems created by recent technological
developments can not be solved by the decisions of individual countries
to each expand their copyright protections. With the Internet, even if
copyrighted works can be well protected in the home country, those
same copyrighted materials can be subject to infringement abroad. As
technology allows copyrighted materials to be transmitted easily around
the globe without the authorization of the copyright owner, there is an
increased need for protection without borders. This protection needs to
be not only substantive, but also procedural. International treaties
establishing minimum rights and other substantive definitions like those

3. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 [hereinafter TRIPs
Agreement]; see Martin D.H. Woodward, TRIPs and NAFTA’s Chapter 17: How Will TradeRelated Multilateral Agreements Affect International Copyright?, 31 TEX. INT’L L.J. 269, 284
(1996) (recognizing that the TRIPs Agreement found common ground among different
nations and potentially succeeded in increasing the level of international copyright
protection).
4. While it has been recognized that the TRIPs Agreement has advanced the effort to
achieve strong worldwide enforcement, “with the continued rapid proliferation of the
Internet, international enforcement of intellectual property rights will remain a significant
and increasingly daunting challenge.”
Matthew V. Pietsch, International Copyright
Infringement and the Internet: An Analysis of the Existing Means of Enforcement, 24
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 273, 277 (2002). However, in this Article I suggest that a new
mechanism for international enforcement of copyrights is the next needed step.
5. See Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law,
1900–2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187 (2000). The premise of Merges’s article is that “intellectual
property law has generally adapted quite well to each successive wave of technological
innovation.” Id. at 2190. Merges includes some examples based on U.S. law, including
movies, radio, television, video recording, software, and piano rolls, and he closes with the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). Id. at 2192–99.
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already in force are not the only measures needed. A procedural
mechanism for international litigation would serve to complement
already existing substantive provisions. This problem of international
enforcement is not entirely new, but it is made more critical by
technological developments.
It is extremely easy to distribute infringing materials throughout the
whole world. Therefore, it is necessary to balance between easy
infringement and expensive enforcement; it is also important to address
the uncertainties involved in international litigation. The risk is not only
the expense of attorneys’ fees, but also that copyright holders do not
know if their efforts to enforce copyrights abroad are going to succeed
or will only be useless wastes of money and time. No doubt, to some
extent these uncertainties are common to all lawsuits, but in most other
contexts there is, at least, a greater amount of precedent for successful
results. The more uncertainty there is about the procedures of
enforcement, applicable laws, or the likely results, the more unwilling
copyright holders will be to try to enforce their rights abroad.
The problem for a copyright holder is not only the potential loss of
earnings due to infringement, but also the additional costs spent in
unsuccessful litigation. Also, there is the risk that the procedure could
be legally successful, but still ineffective at stemming the infringement.
Success in court by receiving a favorable judgment is only the first step;
a favorable judgment is made worthwhile through enforcement.
Enforcing judgments would be easy if all the defendants were residents
of the country of the court that rendered the judgment. In the case of
foreign defendants, it would also be straightforward if they had assets
7
within that country. However, foreign defendants with no assets in the
forum country create a problem. It can be difficult to have national
judgments enforced in the foreign country where the defendant resides
or has assets, and it is also difficult, costly, and time consuming to need

6. During the early stages of implementation of the TRIPs Agreement, Professor
Hamilton presented an article criticizing the TRIPs Agreement, among other things, because
it neglected to address that intellectual property environments would soon be online. See
Marci A. Hamilton, The TRIPS Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated, and Overprotective, 29
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 613 (1996).
7. See Symposium, Copyright’s Long Arm: Enforcing U.S. Copyrights Abroad, 24 LOY.
L.A. ENT. L. REV. 45, 47 (2004). Panelist Rufus Pichler suggested that the first step to
enforce international intellectual property rights is to know where to bring the lawsuit and to
have those rights recognized and enforced. Id. Or, in the alternative, if the enforcement
abroad is too cumbersome, one must focus on other potential defendants that may be local.
Id. at 47–48. Even with regard to local cases, he stressed the need to check for the place of
enforcement. Id.
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to pursue additional copyright litigation abroad. Clear rules about the
enforcement of preliminary injunctions and monetary judgments will
also diminish the inconvenience of dealing with the unknowns of how
foreign judges apply their own substantive and procedural laws. Even if
the cost of international litigation would only be marginally reduced
with this enforcement mechanism, the increased certainty and
probability of success would improve the balance between unfettered
infringement and expensive enforcement.
With the advent of the Internet, it is especially necessary to be able
to have a decision enforced in the home country and abroad. The
proposed mechanism is intended to facilitate certainty in the
enforcement of copyright judgments abroad. It will also help avoid the
re-litigation of the same issues abroad and will bring increased certainty
to the likely results of litigation. Ultimately, the proposed mechanism is
intended to resolve some of the existing problems related to
international copyright litigation that have been aggravated by the
advent of the digital age. While the proposed mechanism does not
pretend to resolve all of these problems—for instance, counterfeiting in
Latin America—it will help to diminish them.
This Article proposes three possible paths. The first path presents a
basis for a possible convention on the recognition and enforcement of
interim measures and judgments related to copyright litigation.
Ultimately, it is not the convention, itself, but rather its component parts
that have to be considered if countries want to engage in the proposed
problem-solving. But should this first and most ambitious path fail, two
other possibilities for overcoming the problem are provided.
In order to facilitate this analysis, the Article is divided into six parts.
Part I considers remedies both from the perspective of the TRIPs
Agreement and according to several national copyright statutes. While
remedies may differ from country to country, they nevertheless tend to
have strong similarities due to the TRIPs Agreement. Part II describes
the problem of the place of infringement and the related rules about
choice of law. Part III addresses concerns related to choosing the right
forum when trying to enforce court decisions, taking into consideration
legal aspects of jurisdiction and its consequences. Part IV considers why
the proposed Hague Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign
Judgments (Hague Draft Convention) failed and sets forth the ways in
which similar failure is to be avoided under the proposed mechanism.
Part V includes an examination and explanation of the proposed
mechanism and analyzes how it would perform in practice. And in
conclusion, Part VI analyzes several issues concerning the consequences
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of the proposed mechanism and discusses legislative decisions and
questions of public choice democracy.
I. AVAILABLE REMEDIES FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
The TRIPs Agreement was the first multilateral agreement to
establish a comprehensive set of remedies. With slight differences,
remedies available under national copyright statutes contain all the
provisions contained in the TRIPs Agreement. Consequently, the
remedies ordered by a court applying its own copyright law would not
8
be completely unfamiliar to other courts.
The problem that could arise, however, is the possible clash of some
of those remedies with a given country’s constitutional principles,
including, for example, free speech, due process of law, and takings
clauses, among others. Arguably, this problem is resolved, at least
partially, by considering the fact that the remedies most likely issued by
the forum court are those available in the place where the remedy is
enforced and are most likely to meet local constitutional tests.
However, it must be remembered that local statutes are not free from
constitutional flaws and are subject to constitutional checks as well.
It is evident that the negotiators of the TRIPs Agreement took into
consideration the constitutional clauses of different countries, as
9
exemplified in Article 46 of the TRIPs Agreement.
Article 46
empowers judicial authorities to destroy and dispose of infringing
materials and the instruments utilized for their creation “unless this
10
would be contrary to existing constitutional requirements.” The issue
then is whether this “unless” phrasing is applicable to the entire
enforcement section of the TRIPs Agreement or only to Article 46. The
answer seems to be that it is not applicable to the whole enforcement
section; otherwise, negotiators would have included this clause in
8. Professor Ginsburg discusses the existence of a supranational copyright code. Jane
C. Ginsburg, International Copyright: From a “Bundle” of National Copyright Laws to a
Supranational Code?, 47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 265, 288 (2000). While she overlooks
some of the gaps of existing major conventions, she ultimately concludes the following:
“International copyright” can no longer accurately be described as a “bundle”
consisting of many separate sticks, each representing a distinct national law, tied
together by a thin ribbon of Berne Convention supranational norms. Today’s
international copyright more closely resembles a giant squid, whose many national
law tentacles emanate from but depend on a large common body of international
norms.
Id. at 289.
9. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 3, art. 46.
10. Id. art. 41.
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11

Article 41, which contains general obligations. Moreover, the phrasing
of the entire enforcement section seems to be carefully crafted in order
12
to meet constitutional requirements of most countries. For instance,
for provisional measures ordered inaudita altera parte, Article 50(4)
establishes that the affected party shall be given notice with the
13
opportunity of reviewing the decision to see whether it is reasonable.
Therefore, it may be concluded that possible constitutional issues were
studied and resolved by the drafters. Obviously, the phrasing will not
prevent constitutional actions against it, but at least it may help to
prevail against them. In addition, when implementing treaty obligations
in their internal law, local legislators have an opportunity to adapt those
obligations to meet the constitutional principles of their respective
countries.
This Article is not intended as an exhaustive study of local remedies,
but merely seeks to examine the remedies available in several
jurisdictions. It also is intended to demonstrate that remedies under
national copyright statutes are, at some point, very similar due to the
14
TRIPs Agreement. Where differences do arise, they are often limited
to the degree of requirements for obtaining a preliminary injunction or
in the compensation of damages. This Article addresses remedies by
dividing them into three categories: temporary or preliminary remedies,
permanent remedies, and monetary remedies.
The copyright statutes in most countries establish preliminary
measures in order to stop infringing activities. These remedies are
available, for instance, in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the
United States, and Mexico without even showing if the infringer acted
intentionally or negligently. In France, for example, preliminary
measures include injunctions to stop infringing activities and the
15
confiscation of infringing copies.
Injunctions to stop infringing

11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. art. 50(4).
14. A key advantage of the TRIPs Agreement is the availability of effective dispute
settlement procedures among Member States. See Daniel R. Bereskin, A Comparison of the
Trademark Provisions of NAFTA and TRIPs, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 1, 4 (1993). Therefore,
Member States are more likely to comply with the TRIPs Agreement in order to avoid trade
sanctions. Id.; see also Graeme W. Austin, Valuing “Domestic Self-Determination” in
International Intellectual Property Jurisprudence, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1155, 1169 (2002)
(suggesting that the TRIPs Agreement provides mechanisms, including trade sanctions, for
testing whether particular policy choices comply with international norms).
15. 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE ch. FRA § 8[4][a] (Paul
Edward Geller & Melville B. Nimmer eds., 2005).
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activities are almost always given by the judge or administrator of the
16
In Germany, an injured party may
respective first instance court.
obtain a preliminary injunction even if the infringement is imminent and
17
has not taken place yet.
In the United States, 17 U.S.C. § 502
establishes that courts may grant preliminary injunctions to prevent
18
These injunctions are to
further harmful conduct by defendants.
remain until the final judgment is rendered. A plaintiff must prove that
he or she is likely to prevail in the final decision of the case, that he or
she will suffer irreparable harm unless the preliminary injunction is
granted, and that he or she would suffer more harm if the injunction is
19
not granted than the defendant would if the injunction is granted. On
the other hand, if the plaintiff clearly proves the infringement, courts
20
are likely to presume the irreparable harm.
In Mexico, the Instituto Mexicano de la Propiedad Industrial
(National Industrial Property Institute), an administrative federal
agency, and the trial courts may order an inspection visit to a given
premises. If federal officials find acts of infringement, they can order
the forfeiture of infringing materials and devices utilized in infringing
21
activities.
Even if these provisions are weak due to the lack of
injunctive relief to stop infringement without the inspection visit, Article
228 of the Industrial Property Act makes the TRIPs Agreement
enforcement provisions self-executing and the infringement can be
stopped without these inspections by directly invoking the TRIPs
22
Agreement provisions.
Because most countries’ national statutes contain enforcement
provisions complying with the enforcement provisions of the TRIPs
Agreement, it is very likely that a Mexican court will find those
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id.
2 id. ch. GER § 8[4][a][i].
17 U.S.C. § 502 (2000).
See ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE
LAW OF COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS 195 (2003).
20. See id.
21. See Ley Federal del Derecho de Autor [L.F.D.A.] [Federal Copyright Act], art. 234,
Diario Oficial de la Federación [D.O.], 24 de Diciembre de 1996 (Mex.) (establishing that the
Industrial Property Act enforcement provisions apply to copyright infringement); see also
Ley de la Propiedad Industrial [L.P.I.] [Industrial Property Act], as amended, arts. 203, 207,
211, 228, Diario Oficial de la Federación [D.O.], 27 de Junio de 1991 (Mex.).
22. In Mexico, almost all treaty provisions containing private rights and remedies are
self-executing. Article 228 of the Industrial Property Act makes all treaty enforcement
provisions self-executing; this includes, for example, the chapter XVII provisions of NAFTA.
L.P.I. [Industrial Property Act] art. 228. Those provisions, however, are similar to the TRIPs
Agreement enforcement provisions.
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provisions similar to those available in Mexico. The process or
assimilation of the TRIPs Agreement is increased by the particular view
of the Mexican Supreme Court that international treaties precede
federal and state law in hierarchy. The result of this view is that in cases
of contrary dispositions between federal or state law and an
international treaty, the latter would prevail. Consequently, injunctive
orders issued by foreign courts are not likely to be against Mexican
public policy.
Permanent remedies usually are the same in the TRIPs Agreement
and in national legal systems. In almost all cases, the preliminary
injunction becomes permanent if the plaintiff prevails on the merits of
the case. In the United States, however, permanent injunctions are not
always granted if the court determines that future infringements are
unlikely or if the court determines that the permanent injunction is
23
unnecessary. Therefore, almost all copyright statutes likely warrant
the grant of permanent injunctions, although in some cases, such a grant
is going to be available only if it is necessary.
While injunctive relief is very similar across diverse legal systems,
differences arise in the case of monetary recoveries. As will be explored
in Part II, the wording of Article 45 of the TRIPs Agreement leaves
national legislatures with the task of determining the amount of award
needed to “adequate[ly] compensate for the injury the right holder has
suffered because of an infringement of his intellectual property right by
an infringer who knew or had reasonable grounds to know that he was
24
engaged in infringing activity.” Thus, the capacity to compensate is left
to national copyright statutes. Whereas some copyright statutes provide
for statutory damages as an option for redress, others are less severe
and leave the right holder with the burden of proving losses or
enrichment by the defendant.
In France, for instance, damages are awarded by taking into
consideration the amount of harm suffered by the plaintiff, equivalent
to profits made by the infringer, and those profits that the plaintiff
25
would have received. Those principles are quite similar to common
law principles. The difference here, as compared to U.S. copyright law,
is that French law does not provide for statutory damages. Moreover,

23. See SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 19, at 195–96.
24. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 3, art. 45(1).
25. 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 15, ch. FRA §
8[4][b].
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even if the copyright law of a given country provides for statutory
damages, the amounts would be different.
In Germany, damages are available if the infringement is intentional
26
or results from negligence. The plaintiff may recover profits made by
the infringer due to the infringement. However, in practice, damages
are often calculated taking into account a “license analogy” of an
equivalent industry or actual fees already received by the plaintiff for
27
the same work. Section 97(3) of the German Copyright Act allows the
plaintiff to recover under the German Civil Code doctrines of unjust
28
enrichment.
The plaintiff may then recover under the previously
explained rules contained in the German Copyright Act and also based
on the German Civil Code doctrine of unjust enrichment.
In the United States, there are three types of monetary recovery:
29
actual damages, defendant’s profits, and statutory damages. According
to 17 U.S.C. § 504(b), the plaintiff may recover actual damages,
consisting of the loss of profits or royalties resulting from the infringing
30
activity, plus any profit made by the defendant. The plaintiff may
recover both damages and profits because the statute not only intends
to compensate losses but also seeks to prevent the infringer from
31
benefiting from his or her wrongful acts. In the alternative, a plaintiff
32
may recover statutory damages instead of actual damages and profits.
The precondition for obtaining statutory damages is registration
with the U.S. Copyright Office prior to the infringement, or in the case
33
of published works, within three months of publication.
Because
international treaties do not require statutory damages, this provision
does not violate the Berne Convention requisite of non-formalities in
34
order to obtain copyright protection.
If a foreign work is not
registered, a plaintiff may still initiate an action and recover actual
damages and profits. However, he or she may not recover statutory
damages. The amount awarded is no less than $750 and no more than
35
$30,000. If the conduct was committed willfully, the amount may be
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

2 id. ch. GER § 8[4][a][ii].
See id.
Id.
17 U.S.C. § 504 (2000).
Id. § 504(b).
See SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 19, at 196.
Id.
Id. at 90.
Id. at 90 n.11.
17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1).
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36

increased to $150,000. However, if the defendant proves that he or she
was not aware or had no reason to believe that his or her conduct was
37
an infringement, the amount cannot be more than $200. It is quite
interesting to note that the amount is for the infringement of each work
no matter how many times the infringement was made.
In Mexico, Article 216bis of the Mexican Copyright Act establishes
that consequential damages always have to reach an amount of no less
than forty percent of the sale price to the public of the infringing
38
product or the cost of the service provided. If the plaintiff can prove
that he or she lost more than the statutory forty percent, he or she will
be entitled to a higher award. But statutory damages of no less than
forty percent of the sale price are not enough to deter infringement;
they leave a margin of sixty percent to the infringer, which is not
desirable because most infringement takes place in the informal
economy. Infringers do not pay taxes or workers’ social benefits, and
their raw materials are cheap. In other cases, when the defendant does
not have profits, a percentage of the sale price will be unsatisfactory,
and trying to recover actual damages would be even more difficult
without yielding any better results. Statutory damages would likely
serve as a more effective deterrent if they inflicted large financial
penalties based on the number of infringed works or the number of
infringing copies instead of being based on a minimum percentage of
the sale price.
Finally, attorneys’ fees are contemplated in Article 45(2) of the
TRIPs Agreement: “[t]he judicial authorities shall have the authority to
order the infringer to pay the right holder expenses, which may include
39
appropriate attorney’s fees.”
However, this wording leaves the
question open as to whether expenses may or may not include
attorneys’ fees. This becomes important when national statutes do not
include attorneys’ fees or subject them to formalities. According to 17
U.S.C. § 412, attorneys’ fees are recoverable only if the work is
40
registered at the U.S. Copyright Office. This precept is applicable to
41
both U.S. works and non-U.S. works. While it is not the purpose of
this Article to determine whether this provision violates Article 45(2) of
36. Id. § 504(c)(2).
37. Id.
38. Ley Federal del Derecho de Autor [L.F.D.A.] [Federal Copyright Act], art. 216bis,
Diario Oficial de la Federación [D.O.], 24 de Diciembre de 1996 (Mex.).
39. Id.
40. 17 U.S.C. § 412.
41. See SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 19, at 90.

BARBOSA ARTICLE

88 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:1

the TRIPs Agreement or the non-formality provisions of Article 5(2) of
the Berne Convention, it is important to consider its practical
implications. For U.S. works, registration is necessary to commence an
infringement action, which is not the case for foreign works under the
Berne Convention or other major copyright agreements. However, the
practical recommendation is, of course, to have those works registered
in the U.S. Copyright Office. In almost all other countries, attorneys’
fees are available to the prevailing plaintiff, even if his or her work is
not registered.
II. PLACE OF INFRINGEMENT AND QUESTIONS OF CHOICE OF LAW
When there is copyright infringement abroad, there are several steps
to be taken in order to claim protection overseas. The first step is to
locate the country where protection is sought. Even if this task does not
represent a problem in principle, the assessment of the place of
infringement may not be as clear as one might hope. Moreover, there
can be several places of infringement according to several national
statutes.
Having determined the place of infringement and the country where
protection is sought, the next step is to look into the national law of the
42
protecting country. It is necessary to look at both national copyright
law and the governing treaty provisions. It is also important to note
how treaty provisions are to be construed and if the international treaty
in question is self-executing or if it has an implementing law. This part
of the Article will address conflicts of law issues that arise when
43
deciding the applicable law to be applied to infringing activities.
42. The choice of a particular country’s protection is a conflict of law issue because that
determination is made based on the applicable law of the possible countries where protection
can be sought.
43. This question should not pose a problem if using traditional rules of choice of law.
However, one scholar noted as follows:
Intellectual property lawyers and intellectual property scholars have on the
whole had little to say about conflicts matters. And, reciprocating the affectation of
nonchalance, conflicts scholars have had very little to say about intellectual property
law. If one scans the principal intellectual property treatises and casebooks, one
largely finds passing discussion of the traditional trinity of private international law
(jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments). The
same has been true . . . with conflict treatises and casebooks; intellectual property is
given short shrift.
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, International Intellectual Property Litigation: A Vehicle for Resurgent
Comparativist Thought?, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 429, 429 (2001). As Professor Dinwoodie notes,
the lack of engagement between intellectual property and conflicts scholars has produced
approaches to resolving copyright choice of law issues that are quite different from traditional
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Identifying the country whose protection is claimed is the starting
point when engaging in international copyright litigation.
The
protecting country is the country where the alleged infringing act
44
occurred. It is well established that the law of the protecting country is
45
the applicable law for infringement that occurs in that jurisdiction.
Under this approach, if an infringement takes place in Mexico, for
example, the protecting country will be Mexico. But this does not
necessarily mean that the forum country would be Mexico. This means
that even if an infringement action is brought to another forum—where
the defendant has his domicile—the applicable law must be that of
46
Mexico.
As already mentioned, the territorial character of copyright law has
led to the creation of several copyright and neighboring rights
conventions. Like the Berne Convention, almost all the conventions
have included the national treatment principle and several minimum
rights. Therefore, when applying foreign copyright law, the outcome
must be somehow predictable in that it must conform to treaty
obligations, such as protected subject matter and remedies. This is
significant because efforts to harmonize create certainty in cases
involving acts that occur abroad or in cases with international elements.
The proposed mechanism may apply to cases where, for one reason
or another, the protecting country is different than the forum country.
In those cases, the forum country may issue injunctive relief enforceable
in the protecting country, if it contains rights and remedies specifically
covered by the copyright law of the protecting country or the TRIPs
47
Agreement. In other words, if the copyright law of the forum country
provides for rights not contained in the TRIPs Agreement and the
protecting country does not provide for those rights, then the
enforcement of the injunctive relief may become uncertain. This lack of
regulation may range from moral rights to secondary liability. However,
before entering into the details of the proposed mechanism, it is
rules. Id. at 430.
44. 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 15, ch. INT §
3[1][a][i].
45. Id.
46. See Austin, supra note 14, at 1180 (analyzing recent trends in U.K. and U.S. courts
rejecting earlier common law assumptions that domestic courts lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over foreign copyright infringements).
47. The TRIPs Agreement can be characterized as one of the most important
harmonization efforts—it first brought harmony to its large membership and then brought
intellectual property into the fields of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its dispute
resolution procedures.
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important to analyze some details about the applicable law in
international litigation.
Unlike cases in the past when hard copies made it easier to locate
the place of infringement, now technological developments have made
this locating task more complex. An infringement might include several
acts that generally are divided as follows: initiating acts, like making
copies or sending communication signals; intermediate acts, including
the importation of copies or the relaying of a signal; and consummating
acts, like the reception of the signal and sales of materials where the
48
copyright is fixed. Complex cases may involve any of those infringing
acts taking place in several jurisdictions—for instance, the transmission
of infringing materials posted on the Internet may create uncertainty
about the applicable law, though arguably it would be the law of the
country of reception. In such cases there will be several protecting
countries whose copyright laws should be analyzed by the forum court.
However, courts have not always taken this approach when deciding
this kind of case. While some courts apply forum copyright legislation
to acts occurring abroad, adding an extraterritorial effect to their
domestic law, others only apply the law of the place where the act took
49
place. The location of where the infringement occurred could also be
complicated in the context of the Internet or electronic communications
and its determination could open the possibility of not explicitly
applying the law of the forum extraterritorially. Another approach is to
apply the law of the place where the infringement caused damages.
The U.S. case of Los Angeles News Service v. Reuters Television
International, Ltd. provides a useful illustration of how courts may differ
when deciding the applicable law of cases involving acts committed
50
abroad. In 1992, a news company took videos of the riots in Los
51
Angeles. Those videos were transmitted to other news agencies within
the United States who, without licenses, copied them and then
52
retransmitted them abroad, principally to European television. In that

48. See 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 15, ch. INT §
3[1][b][iii][A].
49. In an article aimed at criticizing choice of law rules that attempt to avoid the
“bramble bush” of foreign copyright laws, Professor Austin argues that, “at least for the time
being, the preferable approach is for domestic courts to apply the relevant foreign laws to
each instance of foreign infringement.” Austin, supra note 1, at 4.
50. L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l, Ltd., 942 F. Supp. 1265 (C.D. Cal.
1996).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1267.
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case, the district court established that the retransmission was only
53
The court also ruled that the
completed upon reception abroad.
“[d]efendants are not liable under the Copyright Act for damages
arising extraterritorially. This holding does not preclude LA News from
recovering damages for extraterritorial infringement. It can seek a
54
remedy for this infringement under the applicable foreign law.”
Nevertheless, on appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed and established that, because the unauthorized copies were
made in the United States, relief might be granted under U.S. law for
the exploitation abroad, just as if the exploitation had taken place within
55
the United States. The court pointed out that “[r]ecovery of damages
arising from overseas infringing uses was allowed because the predicate
act of infringement occurring within the United States enabled further
56
reproduction abroad.” While the district court relied on a previous
decision establishing that the mere authorization in the United States of
57
acts of infringement abroad does not violate the U.S. Copyright Act,
the appellate court distinguished that decision by establishing that the
case in front of it was not about authorization, but rather about how the
58
making of copies enabled the infringement abroad.
Generally, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has
upheld the application of the U.S. Copyright Act for the distribution of
materials abroad when the originating copy was made in the United
59
States. However, until the Los Angeles News Service decision, the
Ninth Circuit had been reluctant to apply the U.S. Copyright Act to acts
involving the “mere authorization” to infringe abroad. It seems that the

53. See id. at 1269 (quoting Allarcom Pay Television, Ltd. v. Gen. Instrument Corp., 69
F.3d 381, 387 (9th Cir. 1995)).
54. Id.
55. L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 1998),
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1141 (1999).
56. Id.
57. See Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Commc’ns Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1089 (9th Cir.
1994). This decision came under criticism from various sources, including another district
judge who asserted in a subsequent opinion that “Subafilms ignores . . . the economic
incentives underpinning the Copyright Clause designed to encourage creation of new works.”
Curb v. MCA Records, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 586, 595 (M.D. Tenn. 1995). “[P]iracy has changed
since the Barbary days. Today, the raider need not grab the bounty with his own hands; he
need only transmit his go-ahead by wire or telefax to start the presses in a distant land.” Id.
58. See Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1095–98.
59. See, e.g., Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publ’g, Ltd., 843 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1988); Sheldon
v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1939), aff’d, 309 U.S. 390 (1940);
Famous Music Corp. v. Seeco Records, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
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existing split between the Second and the Ninth Circuits has been
resolved with the Los Angeles News Service decision.
The difference between the “mere authorization” and “enabling
infringement” is an example of one of the many complexities related to
the determination of applicable law. Those considerations are part of
the internal law of each country. In this kind of case, the interpretation
of what the statute considers an infringement makes it relevant to
consider where the infringement took place and the degree of
infringement occurring in one place, and whether its law can be
applicable to the whole case, even if some of the acts of infringement
took place abroad. This is significant for the rules of the proposed
mechanism because even when a court accepts that the law of the place
of infringement applies, disagreement regarding the place of
infringement, itself, could pose a problem.
In copyright infringement cases, however, the principle that the law
of the place of infringement determines the applicable law continues to
be the predominant view among courts and scholars:
In the absence of a dispositive contract provision or treaty rule,
the law of the protecting country—the country in which the work
is being exploited without the copyright owner’s authority—
dominates judicial choice of law respecting the protectability of a
work and the rights that attach to it . . . .
....
The general preference for the law of the protecting country
as applicable law in copyright cases reflects the historic principle
60
that copyright is territorial.
This choice of law rule can also be based on principles of national
treatment contained in international copyright conventions.
The default position of national authors is simple. Domestic Law
governs their copyright claims in any case of infringement at
home. . . . Suppose . . . that a foreign author may assert treatybased claims to obtain relief against infringement occurring in a
treaty country. . . . To assure national treatment, the court has to
apply . . . the domestic law . . . of the protecting country. . . . Thus
national treatment leads to results consistent with the choice-oflaw rule traditionally applicable in tort cases. That is the law of
the place of the tort, specifically, the place of the infringement in
61
a copyright case, applies.
60. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT 99–100 (2001).
61. 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 15, ch. INT §
3[1][a][i].
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The importance of this lex loci delicti approach is supported and
explained by Eugen Ulmer in the following excerpt:
Logically it does not imply a reference to the lex fori. If, for
example, a German impresario performs a protected work in
Denmark, the author bringing an action in Germany cannot
claim the protection of German copyright law. The protection
which may be claimed . . . may be granted according to German
law only if the act of infringement is committed in Germany. . . .
. . . [W]hen, according to the general rules of procedural law,
a venue is established within the country, legal protection may be
claimed before the national court on the basis of the foreign
copyright or industrial property right. . . . From the point of view
of private international law it certainly seems consistent to
expand the rule which may be derived from the conventions into
a complete rule of conflict of laws whereby . . . irrespective of the
country in which action is brought, [it] is to be governed by the
law of the country in whose territory the act of the infringement
62
took place.
In cases where all the acts of infringement take place in a single foreign
country, a court may find it less difficult to apply the law governing the
place of the infringement—a foreign copyright law. For instance, in
London Film Productions, Ltd. v. Intercontinental Communications,
63
Inc., a U.S. court applied foreign law to acts of infringement taking
64
place abroad.
In that case, the defendant licensed the plaintiff’s
65
motion pictures in Chile, Peru, Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Panama.
Those motion pictures were in the public domain in the United States,
but not in those countries where the infringement took place. The
district court relied on comity considerations in order to adjudicate the
infringement of the foreign copyright:
A concern with the conduct of American citizens in foreign
countries is merely the reciprocal of that interest.
An
unwillingness by this Court to hear a complaint . . . to a violation
of foreign law will engender . . . a similar unwillingness on the

62. CHRISTOPHER WADLOW, ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 14 (1998) (quoting EUGEN ULMER, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS ¶ 14 (1978)).
63. London Film Prods., Ltd. v. Intercontinental Commc’ns, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 47
(S.D.N.Y. 1984).
64. Id.
65. Id.
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part of a foreign jurisdiction when . . . a violation of our laws
66
[occurs].
This reasoning is quite important; it contains the essence of reciprocity
and comity that later can become an international treaty.
Obviously, the district court started its analysis from the
presumption that the law of the country whose protection is sought—the
67
place of infringement—is the governing law in the case. However, the
difficulty in establishing one clear place of infringement, has led to other
different approaches. For instance, Professor Jane Ginsburg has
proposed an alternative choice of law rule:
[I]f it is possible to localize in the United States the point from
which the communication of the infringing work (whether or not
in material form) becomes available to the public (wherever that
public be located), then U.S. courts should apply U.S. law to all
unauthorized copies, wherever communicated. Similarly, where
the United States is the “nerve center” for foreign distributions,
the domestic acts of planning and intellectually implementing the
offshore acts should suffice to justify the application of U.S. law
68
to the full series of acts.
This approach departs from principles developed by the Second
Circuit, and arguably the Ninth Circuit, and creates a new rule that is
perhaps more appropriate for digital environments.
While this
approach tends to prevent infringing activities in copyright havens or
countries where the protection is weak, it also could be considered as
disregarding the territoriality principle of copyright law. However, this
approach could represent an option for allowing broader room in
defining infringement. But there are activities like “planning and
69
intellectually implementing the offshore acts” that clearly depart from
the traditional principles of choice of law for copyright infringement. In
the latter case, the issue is not the application of national law to foreign
infringements because of the difficulty of finding the place of
infringement, but it is, rather, the deliberate application of national law
to foreign acts of infringement. Under no copyright law does the
planning of an infringement constitute an actual infringement.
While there could be a different interpretation for determining the
place of infringement, sometimes the decision is made to disregard the
66. Id. at 49.
67. Id. at 48–49.
68. Jane C. Ginsburg, Extraterritoriality
Infringement, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 587, 600 (1997).
69. Id.
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place of infringement, itself, only to avoid struggling with foreign
copyright law. However, conflict of law choices leading to the
application of the forum law to acts occurring abroad have been
70
criticized as false pragmatism. If, in a given case, the application of
foreign law is not an element for denial to hear a case under the basis of
forum non conveniens, it would be inconsistent to apply national law to
acts occurring abroad simply to avoid the complexities of foreign
71
copyrights. After all, the concern of misapplication of foreign law is
not exclusive to copyright law but pertains to all areas of conflict of
laws.
The choice of law strategies discussed above have awkwardly
grafted extraterritorial choice of law principles onto a system
whose central assumptions are based on the territoriality of
domestic copyright regimes. Moreover, there are difficult
questions of domestic and international policy that would appear
to accompany these choice of law strategies. Before these choice
of law strategies are expanded even further, these issues deserve
more rigorous attention than they have received thus far in legal
72
literature.
In discussing the “nerve center” choice of law rule, scholar Paul
Goldstein has recommended that “[n]o proposed choice of law rule for
copyright cases should be adopted unless the traditional rule is in fact
73
deficient.” Otherwise, national governments will oppose or resist this
rule, undercutting their national copyright rule for the same reason they
have opposed harmonization efforts, like the TRIPs Agreement, in the
74
past. On the other hand, the traditionally accepted choice of law rule
generates certainty in the results of litigation. Another rule is not going
to be accepted generally and will not be applied consistently among
courts of several countries. Moreover, under the proposed mechanism,
courts will be more willing to enforce an injunction based on foreign law
that has been chosen reasonably.
Even if the result is the same as it would have been if explicitly
applying forum law to acts of infringement committed abroad,
considerations about the place of infringement could make these kinds
of decisions more reasonable. It is different to choose forum law as
applicable because the court considers that the infringement was
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

See Austin, supra note 1, at 41.
See id. at 42.
Id. at 46–47.
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 60, at 101.
See id. at 102.
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committed, at least partially, in the forum territory, than to apply forum
law to acts openly committed abroad. This choice is legitimate if the
forum law was deemed applicable to acts of infringement made abroad,
if such law was chosen because of considerations about the place of
infringement. A determination that the infringement has taken place
within the forum because the infringing act was authorized or enabled
within the forum is a reasonable assessment. Taking into consideration
differences in definitions of infringement and reasoning in different
legal systems may open the door to a more liberal interpretation of the
75
Berne Convention choice of law rule.
Having established the importance of considerations regarding the
place of infringement, I will explain the targeted market approach. This
approach is based on the suggestion that the different approaches to the
conflict of laws between the United States—focused on the needs of
interstate and international systems—and the European Union—
focused on the ordre public international—considered along with the
76
objectives of the Berne Convention and the TRIPs Agreement have
resulted in “a globally coherent fabric of remedies, where different
77
national laws do not interfere with each other.”
Under this rule,
judicial authorities must localize the infringement in the place where it
was completed. In order not to lose the big picture in cross-border
transactions, and instead focus on insolated acts, this “completed act”
78
rule calls for a distinction between incoming and outgoing transactions.
The localization of the transaction in the incoming market is justified
based on audience and cultural goods. It attempts to avoid the
exportation of policies considered as targeted to national audiences to

75. Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention contains a rule of choice of law based on
national treatment. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art.
5(2), Sept. 9, 1886, as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221
[hereinafter Berne Convention]. However, according to Professor Dinwoodie, neither the
Berne Convention nor the TRIPs Agreement are self-executing in the United States. See
Dinwoodie, supra note 43, at 439 n.44. Therefore this rule is not binding on U.S. courts.
Nevertheless, for the purposes of this proposed mechanism, it should be binding or, at least
considered, if copyright holders want U.S. judgments or decrees enforced abroad.
76. The preamble of the Berne Convention establishes that enforcement will be carried
out “in as effective and uniform a manner as possible.” Berne Convention, supra note 75,
pmbl. The preamble of the TRIPs Agreement establishes an “effective and appropriate
means for . . . enforcement . . . taking into account differences in national legal systems.”
TRIPs Agreement, supra note 3, pmbl.
77. 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 15, ch. INT §
3[1][b][ii][A].
78. Id.
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79

other countries’ audiences. The difference between this rule and the
“nerve center” rule is that the nerve center rule may also include the
application of the law of the place where foreign infringements were
planned.
To illustrate, this rule can be applied to the following case in which
the outgoing act, committed in Country A, is directed to the market of
Country B. This includes, for example, shipping materials that are
infringing under Country B’s law, the hosting of these materials on a
Web site, or the up-linking of a satellite signal. Applying the
“completed act” conflict of law rule would result in the application of
the law of Country B to acts committed in Country A.
The Ninth Circuit, for example, has consistently applied this rule and
has established that the infringement of the transmission right does not
80
occur until the public receives the satellite signal. In Allarcom Pay
Television, Ltd. v. General Instrument Corp., the law of the targeted
market governed because it was the law of the place where the
81
transmission was completed. In contrast, the Second Circuit view is
that the transmission does not need to be received by the public in order
to constitute an infringement of the public performance or transmission
82
right established by the U.S. Copyright Act.
Under this latter
approach, the U.S. Copyright Act governs the particular act of uplinking the signal to a satellite, even if the public is located abroad and
83
the transmission was not yet completed. The European Satellite and
Cable Directive also accepts this emission theory, establishing that the
act of communication to the public occurs in the Member State where
84
the signal is up-linked to the satellite. In Mexico, Article 140 of the
79. Id.
80. See Allarcom Pay Television, Ltd. v. Gen. Instrument Corp., 69 F.3d 381 (9th Cir.
1995).
81. See id.
82. See Nat’l Football League v. Primetime 24 Joint Venture, 211 F.3d 10, 12 (2d Cir.
2000).
83. See id. This approach is also shared by the Seventh and Eighth Circuits and the
respective state courts. See, e.g., WGN Cont’l Broad. Co. v. United Video, Inc., 693 F.2d 622,
625 (7th Cir. 1982); Coleman v. ESPN, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 290, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Broad.
Music, Inc. v. Hearst/ABC Viacom Entm’t Servs., 746 F. Supp. 320, 328–29 (S.D.N.Y. 1990);
David v. Showtime/The Movie Channel, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 752, 758–59 (S.D.N.Y. 1988);
Hubbard Broad., Inc. v. S. Satellite Sys., Inc., 593 F. Supp. 808, 813 (D. Minn. 1984), aff’d, 777
F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1985).
84. Council Directive 93/83/EEC, Coordination of Certain Rules Concerning Copyright
and Rights Related to Copyright Applicable to Satellite Broadcasting and Cable
Retransmission, art. 1(2)(b), 1993 O.J. (L 248) 15. As defined in the Directive, “[t]he act of
communication to the public by satellite occurs solely in the Member State where, under the
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Copyright Act also considers the transmission completed when the
85
signal is up-linked to the satellite. Both theories—the down-linking
and up-linking—are not rules of conflict of law, but they are
considerations or assumptions made about the place where the act of
transmission is considered to have taken place; however, the result that
both assumptions produce is ultimately highly related to questions of
choice of law.
The completed act rule can be an alternative offering in order to not
lose the big picture in cross-border transactions, which is a better
justification than the lex forum rule. Obviously, it is related to the
question of where the damage is caused: if the infringing activities are
targeted in one market, it is in that market where the copyright holder is
losing his or her profits; however, the application of the forum law in
these cases may lead to the unwillingness of a court to enforce injunctive
decrees or monetary judgments. Moreover, the application of forum
law may also lead to the issuance of an injunction over an act considered
as non-infringing by the law of the country where the act was
committed.
This is also an important consideration. The attempt to apply a
foreign law to an act committed in a given country can cause several
problems for various reasons. Perhaps the act is not an infringement in
that country. Furthermore, the application of a foreign law to subjects
that did not elect the foreign legislators who created the law raises an
issue of democracy. How can a subject be governed by a law created by
foreign legislators and officials who have no national accountability? If
the result of this law is not acceptable to nationals, they cannot voice
their protest in the following elections. Moreover, national groups did
not participate in the lobbying process or negotiations of that foreign
law. Therefore, their only alternative is to trust in national judges—
those same judges who will enforce measures and judgments based on
the foreign law. The central issue is that the ideal choice of law rule is
the one that makes applicable the law of the place of infringement.
86
As previously discussed, the digital age has created new problems
that are resolved by old rules. The balance of those rules with the new
problems is important for the elaboration of the enforcement
control and responsibility of the broadcasting organization, the programme-carrying signals
are introduced into an uninterrupted chain of communication leading to the satellite and
down towards the earth.” Id.
85. Ley Federal del Derecho de Autor [L.F.D.A.] [Federal Copyright Act], art. 140,
Diario Oficial de la Federación [D.O.], 24 de Diciembre de 1996 (Mex.).
86. See discussion supra Part I.
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mechanism. While there are problems in applying foreign law to certain
acts of infringement taking place in one country, it is also true that new
technology makes it easier to distribute infringing materials in several
87
jurisdictions with different copyright laws. If one puts a Web site on
the Internet that contains infringing materials that are visible in several
jurisdictions, that person has the potential to cause damage in all those
places. It would not be fair to take advantage of new technology to
spread infringing materials and, at the same time, use the current rules
and principles of territoriality to protect oneself from liability. The
reason for the proposed mechanism is to balance those differences.
However, the acceptable choice of law rule for the proposed mechanism
must be determined. Besides the obvious prevailing choice of law
approaches, there are other and different approaches that can be
created in the future. As each case arises, courts may consider new
approaches for determining where the infringement took place.
The prevailing approach must be one that establishes that the
88
applicable law is the law of the place of infringement. However, courts
could be allowed to determine freely where the infringement has taken
place. If the determination is reasonable, then the proposed mechanism
89
is realistic.
Moreover, because the existing international copyright
regime of the TRIPs Agreement and the Berne Convention has led to

87. According to Professor Dinwoodie, if courts are engaged in serious copyright choice
of law analysis and sometimes contemplate the application of foreign law, it is necessary to
engage in comparative work. Dinwoodie, supra note 43, at 451.
88. An alternative is to apply one law for ownership and apply another law to
infringement. In Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., the court applied
Russian law to questions of ownership and U.S. law to questions of infringement: “On
infringement issues, the governing conflicts principle is usually lex loci delicti, the doctrine
generally applicable to torts. . . . In the pending case, the place of the tort is plainly the United
States.” Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d 82, 91 (2d Cir.
1998).
89. But see Nathan R. Wollman, Maneuvering Through the Landmines of
Multiterritorial Copyright Litigation:
How to Avoid the Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality When Attempting to Recover for the Foreign Exploitation of U.S.
Copyrighted Works, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 343, 391 (2002) (suggesting that “justifications for
the presumption against the extraterritorial application of U.S. copyright law are so strong
with respect to this federal statute that the presumption . . . itself is the first major hurdle for a
U.S. rights holder”). The article enumerates some of the arguments for territorial U.S.
copyright law. Id. at 348–50. Then the author offers “loopholes” in order to overcome those
territorial conceptions. Id. at 367–78. Finally, it shows certain jurisdictional concerns in order
to recover. Id. at 380–90. However, no consideration is given to the situation in which a
defendant has no assets, domicile, or other way to pursue enforcement within the United
States.
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the creation of a “coherent fabric of remedies” with rules that do not
interfere with each other, based on the needs of the international system
and on the ordre public international, this could be used as an argument
91
for applying the law of the place where the infringement occurred.
The same argument could be used to allow courts to determine the
place of infringement. It might also be feasible to hold a convention to
determine where the infringement took place and assess the applicable
law. However, because countries are not likely to reach a consensus on
this issue, this ambitious plan could fail as have other attempts to
harmonize international litigation. Furthermore, as new technologies
emerge, the set of rules for determining the place of infringement could
become obsolete even before consensus is achieved.
III. EXERCISING RIGHTS IN THE RIGHT FORUM—QUESTIONS OF
JURISDICTION
Taking jurisdiction over acts occurring abroad may be controversial.
The considerations to be discussed here cover European and common
law approaches; while both systems have remarkable differences
reflected in the difficulties in achieving an international convention on
jurisdiction and judgments, several existing principles can be the basis
for the proposed mechanism without relying on the Hague Draft
92
Convention. Obviously, the proposed mechanism is independent from
the failed Hague Draft Convention. This is because there are several
convergences in both systems that may allow the application of the
mechanism in several infringement cases.

90. 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 15, ch. INT §
3[1][b][ii][A].
91. Paul Edward Geller, International Intellectual Property, Conflicts of Laws, and
Internet Remedies, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. RTS. 130 (2005).
92. Note, for example, instances of common ground between the two approaches as
evidenced by the United Kingdom and Ireland. The United Kingdom and Ireland, common
law tradition countries, have implemented European Union regulations and given up several
common law approaches. See Brandon B. Danford, The Enforcement of Foreign Money
Judgments in the United States and Europe: How Can We Achieve a Comprehensive Treaty?,
23 REV. LITIG. 381, 411 (2004). But the problems associated with the Hague Draft
Convention evidence persistent challenges of achieving an international convention,
specifically with respect to enforcing international judgments in the midst of sometimes
divergent systems. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Draft Convention on
Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Oct. 30, 1999,
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgmpd11.pdf [hereinafter Hague Draft Convention].
Nevertheless, the proposed mechanism seeks to carve out the areas of common ground to
create opportunities for improved enforcement and protection of the rights of copyright
holders.
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Allow me to first briefly discuss some relevant aspects of jurisdiction
in the European Union and common law countries. This is not a
complete survey on jurisdiction; it only covers the important aspects of
litigation related to copyright infringement. A brief explanation about
the difficulties presented in the negotiations of the proposed Hague
Draft Convention will follow. I will then propose an alternative under
which the proposed mechanism may be applied without the Hague
Draft Convention.
A. Jurisdiction in European Union or Civil Law Tradition Countries
The European Union regulations are representative of how civil law
tradition countries deal with questions of jurisdiction. In 1968, the
European Union developed the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction
and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters
93
(Brussels Convention).
The European Union also developed the
Lugano Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments
in Civil and Commercial Matters (Lugano Convention) in 1988, with
similar provisions expanding the Brussels Convention to non-member
states belonging to the European Free Trade Agreement Area
94
(EFTA). Both Conventions, however, have been superseded by the
European Union Council Regulation on Jurisdiction and the
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
95
Matters (EC Regulation). The EC Regulation entered into force on
96
It does not apply between Denmark and other
March 1, 2002.
European Union members, but in this case the Brussels Convention still
97
applies. It is also composed of the same provisions as the Brussels
98
Convention except for the enumeration of some of its provisions.
93. 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 1972 O.J. (L 299) 32 [hereinafter Brussels
Convention]; see Council Regulation 44/2001, Jurisdiction and the Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, pmbl. (5), 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1
[hereinafter EC Regulation].
94. Convention on the Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Sept. 16, 1988, 1988 O.J. (L 319) 9 [hereinafter Lugano Convention]; see
EC Regulation, supra note 93, pmbl. (5).
95. EC Regulation, supra note 93, pmbl. (5).
96. Id. art. 76.
97. Id. pmbl. (22).
98. In an article that compares the approaches of U.S. and European jurisdictions,
Professor Juenger remarks on the impressive progress made by the European Community in
a remarkably short time. He notes that where “multistate jurisdictional problems are
amenable to rational solutions . . . national sovereignty need not inhibit the framing of
workable rules.” Friedrich Juenger, Judicial Jurisdiction in the United States and in the
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The general rule about jurisdiction of the EC Regulation is
contained in Article 2, which establishes that “persons domiciled in a
Member State shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of
99
that Member State.” As an exception, Article 5(3) establishes that a
Member State may be sued in another Member State “in matters
relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the courts for the place where
100
the harmful event occurred or may occur.”
The place where the
harmful effect occurred has been construed quite broadly to cover the
place where the commencing act took place or the place where the
101
damages were suffered.
However, a key decision has determined a
limitation of jurisdiction; while the court of the place where the
defendant has his or her domicile may award damages in that country
102
and abroad, courts having jurisdiction based on Article 5(3) can only
award damages suffered in the forum country:
On a proper construction of the expression place where the
harmful event occurred in article 5(3) . . . the victim of a libel by
a newspaper article distributed in several contracting states may
bring an action for damages against the publisher either before
the courts of the contracting state of the place where the
publisher of the defamatory publication is established, which
have jurisdiction to award damages for all the harm caused by
the defamation, or before the courts of each contracting state in
which the publication was distributed and where the victim
claims to have suffered injury to his reputation, which have
jurisdiction to rule solely in respect of the harm caused in the
103
state of the court seised.
Another basis for jurisdiction is established by Article 6(1) of the
EC Regulation, which establishes that a court may exercise jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant if he or she is one of a number of
defendants for actions closely connected and “it is expedient to hear and
determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments
104
resulting from separate proceedings.”
This provision is similar to
those provisions contained in several Mexican codes of civil procedure,
including the Nuevo Leon Code of Civil Procedure, which established
European Communities: A Comparison, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1195, 1212 (1984).
99. EC Regulation, supra note 93, art. 2(1).
100. Id. art. 5(3).
101. See 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 15, ch. INT §
6[1][a].
102. See Case C-68/93, Shevill v. Presse Alliance SA, 1995 E.C.R. I-415.
103. Id.
104. EC Regulation, supra note 93, art. 6(1).
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that “when there are several defendants having different domiciles,
105
jurisdiction shall be for the court of the domicile chosen by plaintiff.”
The Mexican Supreme Court has held that such legal precepts are
106
constitutional.
Similarly, this kind of legal precept would pass any
constitutional test in countries belonging to the civil law tradition
system. Moreover, it is important to note that, contrary to Article 6(1)
of the EC Regulation, equivalent Mexican provisions have no
107
requirements aimed at avoiding the risk of inconsistent judgments.
But it is also important to note that jurisdiction over a non-forum
resident taken by this multi-defendant approach can be difficult to
enforce in common law countries.
Another important provision of the EC Regulation for intellectual
property litigation is established by Article 22(4), giving exclusive
jurisdiction for the courts where the deposit or registration has been
applied in “proceedings concerned with the registration or validity of
patents, trade marks, designs, or other similar rights required to be
108
deposited or registered.” However, because Article 5(2) of the Berne
Convention establishes that copyright protection “shall not be subject to
any formality” regulation, Article 22(4) is inapplicable to copyright
109
litigation.
Because copyright is obtained upon fixation and not by a
decision of government officials, there is no need to enter into the
controversial task for a court to question the validity of activities of a
foreign government official. This task is considered improper in most
110
courts and creates several difficulties.
Even if the EC Regulation does not codify the common law doctrine
of forum non conveniens, it precludes courts from declining jurisdiction
111
or dismissing a case based on it. The EC Regulation takes from the
105. Código de Procedimientos Civiles de estado de Nuevo Leon [C.P.C.] [Nuevo Leon
Code of Civil Procedure], art. 111(IV), 3 de Febrero de 1973 (Mex.) (translated by author).
Most of the states have similar provisions in their respective civil procedure codes.
106. See TERCERA SALA COMPETENCIA CIVIL, Pleno de la Suprema Corte de
Justicia [S.C.J.N.] [Supreme Court], Semanario Judicial de la Federación, Octava Epoca,
tomo X, Agosto de 1992, 52/92, Página 147 (Mex.). This resolution decided a conflict on
jurisdiction between the First Civil District Court in the Federal District and the Fifth District
Court in the State of Mexico.
107. EC Regulation, supra note 93, art. 6(1).
108. Id. art. 22(4).
109. Berne Convention, supra note 75.
110. See, e.g., Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 871 (1956) (discussing the difficulties arising in the trademark context).
However, copyright is different than trademark since it is obtained at the moment of fixation,
not by a decision of an official. See Berne Convention, supra note 75, art. 5(2).
111. See 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 15, ch. INT §
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civil law the obligation for judges to exercise their jurisdiction unless
112
statutory provisions establish otherwise. The key provision of the EC
Regulation is that orders and judgments of courts located in one
Member State can be enforced in courts of another. Article 32 defines
“judgment” as including decrees, orders, decisions, writs of execution, as
113
well as the determination of costs. The EC Regulation compels courts
114
to enforce those orders and judgments without reviewing the merits.
Therefore, a party that has prevailed in a judgment rendered in a
European Member State can enforce it across Member States without a
re-hearing on the merits. The grounds for non-recognition are limited
to the following: matters of public policy for the enforcing country,
default judgments for lack of appearance, cases in which service of
process was not given properly, and instances governed by res judicata
when the judgment is inconsistent with prior judgments between the
115
parties.
The broad definition of judgment established by Article 32 and
covered by the enforcement procedures arguably includes preliminary
116
injunctions.
However, obtaining a preliminary injunction in one
country and trying to enforce it in another is quite controversial and
117
there are only a few cases in which this actually has occurred.
Moreover, when interpreting the Brussels Convention enforcement
procedures, the European Court of Justice has determined that
preliminary injunctions directed against a party who had not been
118
summoned are not covered.
This is because under the Brussels
Convention, grounds for non-recognition include a default judgment or
119
If this becomes a
a decision rendered without service of process.
problem within the European Union, where substantive and procedural
harmonization exists, such enforcement may become more difficult in

6[1][a]. The holding in Coin Controls, Ltd. v. Suzo Int’l (UK) Ltd. also illustrates that a
dismissal based on forum non conveniens is not available if the Brussels Convention applies.
Coin Controls, Ltd. v. Suzo Int’l (UK) Ltd. [1997] F.S.R. 660 (Ch.).
112. See 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 15, ch. INT §
6[1][a]; see also Joachim Zekoll, The Role and Status of American Law in the Hague
Judgments Convention Project, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1283, 1297 (1998).
113. EC Regulation, supra note 93, art. 32.
114. See id. art. 36.
115. See id. art. 33.
116. Id. art. 32.
117. See 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 15, ch. INT §
6[1][a]; see also Symposium, supra note 7, at 48.
118. Case 125/79, Denilauler v. SNC Couchet Frères, 1980 E.C.R. 1553.
119. EC Regulation, supra note 93, art. 33.
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litigation involving third countries—for instance, an injunction issued in
the United States for enforcement in Mexico or another country in
Latin America.
[O]n the preliminary injunctions, temporary restraining order, as
a general matter, it would be very difficult if not impossible to
have a preliminary judgment enforced in any other country.
There is a strong opposition to enforcing preliminary . . .
judgments because there has been no full trial on the merits, so
that will be the likely choice only if you have an opportunity to
120
locally enforce that preliminary measure.
This reality represents one of the main difficulties for the proposed
mechanism, including a way to enforce preliminary injunctions abroad.
Perhaps this is the main difficulty for the proposed mechanism. I will,
however, endeavor to address this problem through one of the proposed
paths. An injunction to stop an actual and clear infringement would not
be difficult if this procedural remedy is also available in courts of the
country whose protection is sought and if the defendant was given a
proper service of process.
The EC Regulation also offers an alternative for overcoming the
121
aforementioned problem. Article 31 of the EC Regulation allows the
application of provisional measures in a Member State even if the
Regulation mandates jurisdiction on the merits in another Member
State:
Application may be made to the courts of a Member State for
such provisional, including protective, measures as may be
available under the law of that State, even if, under this
Regulation, the courts of another Member State have jurisdiction
122
as to the substance of the matter.
Therefore, right holders may apply for preliminary injunctive relief in
one Member State even if jurisdiction will be taken by a court of
another Member State. For instance, in cases where the infringement
originates in one Member State but has effects in another, it is possible
to apply for preliminary injunctive relief in the originating country and
then to adjudicate the case in another Member State where the
infringement caused most of the damage.

120. Symposium, supra note 7, at 48.
121. See EC Regulation, supra note 93.
122. Id. art. 31.
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B. Jurisdiction in the United States and Common Law Tradition
Countries
I briefly turn now to a discussion of common law approaches to
jurisdiction. The EC Regulation is highly influenced by the civil law
123
tradition; therefore, the analysis of common law approaches on
jurisdiction will focus on the United States rather than the United
Kingdom. Obviously, there are U.S. constitutional principles that are
not present in other common law tradition countries, but the U.S.
124
approach is still the most representative.
Under U.S. law, there are two important aspects related to
jurisdiction.
First, there can be jurisdiction over nonresidents
125
committing acts abroad that have effects in the United States. Second,
a court that has jurisdiction to hear a case may dismiss it under the
126
doctrine of forum non conveniens.
Both characteristics are not
present in civil law countries, where jurisdiction is expected to be taken
in the location where the defendant is domiciled, and courts are bound
to hear a case if they have jurisdiction over it.
For copyright cases, including those where the infringement has
occurred abroad,
[f]ederal courts in the United States have personal jurisdiction if,
along with proper service, there are contacts sufficient under
constitutional and statutory criteria; they have subject-matter
jurisdiction in cases that include, most relevantly for our
purposes, parties of diverse citizenship or actions arising under
127
the Copyright Act or U.S. treaties.
Personal jurisdiction can be exercised over a nonresident defendant
committing acts outside the forum that have effects within the forum. In
order to establish if there is jurisdiction, the court must look first to the
long-arm statute of the state where the court is sitting; if the individual
activity or situation meets the statutory provision, the court must
123. See Ana Gardella & Luca G. Radicati di Brozolo, Civil Law, Common Law and
Market Integration: The EC Approach to Conflicts of Jurisdiction, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 611,
612 (2003).
124. In the United Kingdom, for example, the minimum contacts principles are not
applied as they would be in the United States. See also Zekoll, supra note 112, at 1290
(arguing that even if the Brussels and Lugano Conventions fill the gap between the United
Kingdom and its civil law tradition neighbors, that is not likely the case in other common law
tradition countries like the United States).
125. See 2 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 15, ch. USA
§ 8[3][a].
126. Id.
127. 1 id. ch. INT § 6[1][b].
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establish if the exercise of jurisdiction in that specific case is within due
128
process or constitutional requirements.
For instance, in Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, the Second
Circuit analyzed New York law and established that the conduct of the
nonresident defendant did not comport with the statutory provisions
and therefore it was not necessary to analyze if the exercise of
129
jurisdiction was within constitutional limits.
State long-arm statutes
may vary. In this case, the New York statute established the
circumstances under which a court may exercise jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants committing acts outside the state. The court
interpreted the limits to its jurisdiction as follows:
[T]he New York Legislature enacted sub-paragraph (a)(3),
which provides in pertinent part that New York courts may
exercise jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who commits a
tortious act without the state, causing injury to person or
property within the state. . . . [I]t restricted the exercise of
jurisdiction under sub-paragraph (a)(3) to persons who expect or
should reasonably expect the tortious act to have consequences
in the state and in addition derive substantial revenue from
130
interstate commerce.
If the state long-arm statute otherwise establishes jurisdiction, the
next step then is to analyze if the exercise of jurisdiction in that case is
within the constitutional limits. The determination of whether the
exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant case complies with
due process is generally made by a three-part test:
(1) [t]he nonresident defendant must do some act or
consummate some transaction with the forum or perform some
act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of
conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits
and protections of its laws[;] (2) [t]he claim must be one which
arises out of or results from his forum-related activities[; and] (3)
131
[e]xercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable.
Those acts established by the first part of the test may include an
economic transaction within the state, an agent or a representative
within the state, toll-free numbers or other targeted market activities
128. See Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25, 27–28 (2d Cir. 1997).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 29.
131. Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1287 (9th Cir. 1977).
These factors were articulated in Data Disc as an “approach to evaluation” and later
reiterated as a three-part test. See, e.g., Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 1995);
Omeluk v. Langsten Slip & Batbyggeri A/S, 52 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir. 1995).
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directed to the state, or Internet accesses by residents of the state
measured by the number of clicks and the grade of interactivity of the
home page. While those factors may influence the exercise of
jurisdiction, there is no clear rule about jurisdiction of a U.S. federal
court over a nonresident defendant committing acts outside the state.
The previously mentioned elements are analyzed as each case is
presented, and, therefore, there is no absolute certainty about the
outcome. What is certain is that U.S. federal courts can exercise
jurisdiction over a foreign defendant committing infringing acts abroad
that have effects in the United States. Otherwise, under civil law
tradition, the only court that has jurisdiction in torts or quasi-delict
actions is the court of the place where the defendant has his or her
domicile. Therefore, the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant committing acts abroad can be exorbitant in the view of some
civil law tradition lawyers, including judges, because Article 5(3) of the
132
EC Regulation is not common in all civil law tradition countries. On
the contrary, certain “normal” rules of several civil law tradition
countries could be unacceptable under common law or the U.S.
constitutional view—for instance, the exercise of jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant without connections with the forum just because
he or she is one of multiple defendants or, for example, the application
of Article 14 of the French Civil Code establishing that a French
133
national can sue anyone in a French court.
Obviously, the latter
provision is not applicable if the EC Regulation applies, but if not, those
kinds of provisions would apply.
Another important doctrine of the U.S. legal system that is absent—
or in some cases, proscribed—in civil law tradition countries and the EC
Regulation is the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Under this
doctrine, a court with jurisdiction may dismiss a case for other reasons.
In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, the U.S. Supreme Court established private
and public factors to be considered in order to dismiss an action on the
134
grounds of forum non conveniens.
The private factors included the
relatively easy access to sources of proof like the availability of
compulsory processes to get evidence and costs, the possibility to view
premises, and factors related to practical problems that make the trial
135
Public factors included the administrative
easy and inexpensive.

132.
133.
134.
135.

See EC Regulation, supra note 93, art. 5(3).
CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 14 (Fr.).
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
Id. at 508.
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difficulties of the court when hearing the case, especially the application
of a foreign statute, and the local interests in having that controversy
136
resolved in a home court. The doctrine of forum non conveniens, as
established in Gilbert, has evolved and now the threshold analysis is
137
whether there is an alternative forum for the action.
If there is an
alternative forum, then the analysis of public and private factors can be
138
performed.
IV. THE FAILED HAGUE DRAFT CONVENTION–AN EXPLANATION OF
ITS INEFFECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS
A proposed mechanism for enforcing preliminary injunctions or
judgments in copyright actions may be possible despite the failure of the
proposed Hague Draft Convention. It is first important, though, to
consider how and why those negotiations failed.
There were several difficulties in completing the Hague Draft
Convention project. Consensus among the parties was difficult because
of several differences in their respective legal systems. The difficulties
mentioned here are based on those described by an author that served
139
on the U.S. delegation at the Hague Conference. The first is that the
European Union had previously held the Brussels Convention, the
Lugano Convention, and developed the EC Regulation. The bargaining
position of the European Union has been to work and sign agreements
based on rules that have worked in the past. There is also a fear of U.S.
monetary damages awards like, for example, the highly publicized
140
multi-million dollar judgments for injuries suffered due to hot coffee.
Another reason is that the United States has not written rules about
jurisdiction. It developed its law in this area based on U.S. Supreme
Court decisions interpreting the Due Process Clause. Those principles
were developed not by statutory enactment, but by interpretation
136. Id. at 508–09.
137. See id.; see also Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981); Bodner v.
Banque Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d 117, 132 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (indicating that lack of comparable
laws and opportunities for redress in alternative forum is considered in assessing forum non
conveniens and conflict of law).
138. See 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 15, ch. INT §
6[1][b].
139. See Peter D. Trooboff, Ten (and Probably More) Difficulties in Negotiating a
Worldwide Convention on International Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments: Some
Initial Lessons, in A GLOBAL LAW OF JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS: LESSONS FROM THE
HAGUE 263 (John J. Barceló III & Kevin M. Clermont eds., 2002).
140. See, e.g., Bryan Miller, Hey, Waiter! Now There’s a Lawyer in My Soup, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 12, 1995, at D16.
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establishing principles of “fundamental notions of fair play and
substantial justice,” “purposeful availment,” “reasonableness,” and
141
Even if those principles are codified by the American Law
others.
Institute in a Restatement, their incorporation into an international
agreement that will be interpreted by courts in different countries is
142
unlikely.
Those principles, even if codified in an international
agreement, are not likely to be applied properly due to the formalistic
approaches of civil law tradition countries, as in the approach reflected
143
in the Hague Draft Convention.
This represents a problem for
bargaining in an international jurisdiction convention. Even if those
U.S. principles had been codified in the Hague Draft Convention, it was
144
very unlikely that they would be applied as planned.
In addition, there are several principles that came from the Brussels
Convention, now included in the EC Regulation, that would be
unconstitutional under the U.S. Constitution. For instance, jurisdiction
based only on the place where the injury was caused is contained in
145
Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention.
In such a case, there is no
other connection by the defendant with the forum. Another example is
Article 6, establishing that the jurisdiction in a case with multiple
defendants will be the court of the domicile of the defendant chosen by
146
the right holder.
In this case, the rest of the defendants have no
connection at all with the forum.
Lack of consensus was also due to Article 5(5), which was added to
147
the Hague Draft Convention. This legal precept prohibits jurisdiction
148
It limits jurisdiction
that otherwise can be asserted by a U.S. court.
over foreign defendants that have activities within the forum to disputes
149
related to operations of a branch agency or establishment. Therefore,
if there is no legal presence in the United States, a foreign company
could not be subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts, even if it is

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
art. 5(3).
146.
147.
art. 5(5).
148.
149.

Trooboff, supra note 139, at 265.
See id. at 266.
See id. at 268.
See id.
Brussels Convention, supra note 93, art. 5(3); see EC Regulation, supra note 93,
Brussels Convention, supra note 93, art. 6; see EC Regulation, supra note 93, art. 6.
Brussels Convention, supra note 93, art. 5(5); see EC Regulation, supra note 93,
See supra note 147.
See supra note 147.
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engaged in a wide range of activities.
The nonconformity by U.S.
negotiators is described in the following statement: “[i]n brief, the U.S.
courts base their assertion of personal jurisdiction on the relationship of
the defendant to the forum state and not on the particular legal
151
structure of such activity.”
The EC Regulation also establishes certain measures to protect
consumers and employees. Those protections specify that consumers
and employees are not bound by choice of forum clauses until a dispute
actually arises. The negotiator, Peter D. Trooboff, found that those
European public policies should not be exported worldwide; he also
stressed the opposition of American and even European companies to
being subject to jurisdiction abroad despite the presence of a contrary
152
choice of forum clause.
Moreover, there were concerns about the
advent of the Internet because providers of goods and services “do not
153
even know where their consumers are located.”
There is also the
argument that if the consumers agree by “click” agreement not to sue
154
the provider in their home courts, they should honor that agreement.
In addition, even if the EC Regulation prohibits the use of the forum
non conveniens doctrine, Article 22 of the Hague Draft Convention
allows for its application in a very limited form. The doctrine would not
be applied to consumer or employee contracts, and, where applicable,
there would be a security when jurisdiction of the alternative forum is
155
based on national law rather than conventional law.
Another difficulty was the discussion of the disconnection clause
156
contained in Article 37.
There were several European proposals in
order to exclude the Hague Draft Convention in cases where the
Brussels Convention or the EC Regulation applies. While other
delegations sought a worldwide convention taking precedence over
regional conventions, the Europeans preferred to preserve the
prevalence of the EC Regulation. This problem is not easily overcome;
if such a “disconnection clause” were to succeed along with the Hague
Draft Convention, then suits brought within the European Union by a

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Trooboff, supra note 139, at 269.
Id.
See id. at 270.
Id. at 271.
Id.
Id. at 272.
Id. at 273–74.
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citizen of another Hague Member State would be governed by the EC
157
Regulation instead of the Hague Draft Convention.
The problems described above were not the only difficulties in
achieving the consensus necessary to crystallize an international
convention on jurisdiction and enforcement.
In proposing this
mechanism, I will posit a new set of rules, different from those rules that
158
failed in the prior negotiation stage. The rules I propose will be based
on the convergence of both common law and civil law traditions. The
emphasis is not on the different approaches on jurisdiction that both
legal traditions have, but on a point in between that is hopefully
acceptable for all.
V. PROPOSED MECHANISM
As was previously mentioned, the proposed mechanism offers three
alternative paths for a solution—making provisions for possible failures.
The first path is based on an international convention on jurisdiction
and recognition of judgments and decrees from copyright cases; the
second is based on comity; and the third is premised on a reliance on
administrative remedies available in countries where the rate of piracy is
unusually high. The first path is the most important—and ambitious—
proposal of this Article.
A. International Convention on Recognition of Copyright Decrees and
Judgments
As experience has shown, an international convention on
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments is rather difficult to
achieve. There are no conventions of this kind at a multilateral level
and only a few bilateral treaties, besides the EC Regulations, have
succeeded in their negotiations. The primary reason for difficulties in
achieving a convention on recognition and enforcement at the
multilateral level is related to discrepancies among countries in their
159
rules to assess jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. Also, there is
160
a fear of large punitive damages awards. However, if the scope of an
international convention is restricted to copyright litigation where there
are no punitive damages and where different laws seem to be better
157. Id. at 274–75.
158. Areas of disagreement also have been identified by other scholars.
Danford, supra note 92, at 408–14.
159. See supra Part IV.
160. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.

See, e.g.,
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harmonized with similar remedies, the likelihood of successful
negotiations will increase.
This was likely the case for the United Nations Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York
Convention) and the Inter-American Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration (Panama Convention); both have a large
161
number of adherents and are widely recognized.
This large
acceptance is due to the fact that both conventions are applicable only
to cases of arbitration where there is an arbitral agreement or clause
among parties and there are grounds for non-recognition. Grounds for
non-recognition include arbitral awards not covered by the convention
162
and circumstances such that it would be against domestic public policy.
The limitation in the application—not to all cases, but just for arbitral
cases—and the inclusion of grounds for non-recognition, including
domestic public policy, were the key provisions for the acceptance of
these conventions.
Having explained the difficulties of a general litigation jurisdiction
and enforcement convention, I now turn to an explanation of the
proposed bases for a possible convention that will cover copyright
infringement cases. The first issue that I will examine is the application
of the proposed convention, then questions of jurisdiction and
applicable law, problems with preliminary injunctions, and finally,
grounds for non-recognition.
1. Application
These proposed bases are limited to copyright infringement cases.
Their scope is not open to other intellectual property rights. Due to the
non-formalities requirement of the Berne Convention, copyrights are in
the best position to be litigated internationally; no copyright prosecution
is necessary to obtain protection so copyrighted works are protected
163
automatically in the Member States of major copyright conventions.
There is no need for an administrative determination regarding the

161. See, e.g., Organization of American States, B-35: Inter-American Convention on
International Commercial Arbitration, http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/b-35.html (last
visited Dec. 22, 2006) (stating that there are nineteen parties to the convention as of 1995);
WIPO, Parties to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/arbitration/ny-convention/parties.html (last visited Dec.
22, 2006) (stating that there are 137 parties to the convention as of Jan. 30, 2006).
162. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art.
5, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3.
163. Berne Convention, supra note 75, art. 5(2).
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creation of the right, and consequently, it is not necessary to review any
164
There are some
act of any official, either national or foreign.
countries in which available remedies are limited if there is no
registration, but most countries do not restrict remedies if the work is
not registered. Copyrights are different than trademarks or patents
where the validity of the act of issuance could be at stake in each
infringement action commenced by the holder because copyrights do
165
not depend on the issuance of a title for their creation.
In the course of copyright litigation, several things have to be
demonstrated by the plaintiff and several defenses may be pursued by
the defendant. As long as these questions are present in litigation, they
must be resolved by the court hearing the case. Therefore, even if an
infringement of a copyright is the threshold and arguably the unique
cause of action for which this proposal would apply, there are other
themes that incidentally need to be covered here, including ownership,
protected subject matter, and the taking of an idea.
In an action for copyright infringement, the plaintiff has to
demonstrate that he or she is the holder of a valid copyright and that the
166
defendant is infringing one or more of his or her exclusive rights.
There could be cases in which the defendant copied the whole of the
plaintiff’s valid work with no excusatory defenses or fair use. Even so,
the defendant can claim a wide range of defenses, including arguing that
the plaintiff has no title over the copyright in the place where the
infringement took place or in any place. If this is the case, the court
must look to the original copyright holder and then try to find the chain
of titles until it reaches the plaintiff. In this kind of case, the court must
look into the details of the applicable law of each assignment and into
the assignment agreement, itself. Therefore, while this proposal is not
intended to cover ownership, at any time in an infringement action a
court may resolve questions of ownership, and so the proposal will cover

164. See supra note 110.
165. Obviously, this is not intended for defamation or libel actions. The challenges in
those actions are different from those in international copyright litigation. Unlike copyright
law, which is harmonized at some point by international conventions, the underlying policies
governing defamation and libel actions are very different in each country. The complexities
of defamation and libel actions may include injunctions to not litigate, free speech issues, or
other various claims. For a complete analysis, see John Di Bari, A Survey of the Internet
Jurisdiction Universe, 18 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 123 (2005).
166. See, e.g., 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 15, ch.
INT §§ 4–5.
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those questions. Another determination would create an escape for
defendants that would operate by questioning the plaintiff’s title.
It is also important to note cases where the infringement is not as
obvious. Those cases involve a defendant taking ideas or non-original
parts of the work so that courts have to look carefully into the details of
the applicable copyright law in order to determine what constitutes an
infringement. Other infringement actions may involve situations in
which there is no other expression available for the defendant to use the
underlying idea. If this is the case, the protection of that work would be
more limited. However, this limited protection could change if the
applicable law changes.
Even if there are differences in the means of resolving all possible
questions that arise in copyright infringement cases, those questions
must be resolved according to the applicable law chosen. Because there
is some degree of harmonization, most of those questions are likely to
be resolved in a predictable way. Consequently, the proposal will cover
all the necessary questions to be resolved in an infringement action
according to the applicable law chosen.
2. Jurisdiction
As for the question of jurisdiction, it is important to find a point of
167
convergence in both legal traditions.
In this Article, there are
explanations of how the assessment of jurisdiction works in each legal
tradition. While the differences are remarkable, it is also true that there
is a point in the middle that could be acceptable for lawyers on both
sides of those legal traditions. I will revisit briefly the bases for
jurisdiction in both legal systems and then find the points of
convergence that will be used for the proposed convention.
In order to determine jurisdiction, there are several key provisions
worth noting from the EC Regulation that are representative of the civil
168
law tradition approach.
Article 2 establishes the domicile of the
169
defendant as a general rule for jurisdiction. If a defendant resides in
one state, he or she may be sued in that state. This provision does not
represent any conflict with common law tradition approaches where
similar rules could apply. However, while there is a tendency to forum

167. If the court rendering judgment finds jurisdiction that is so exorbitant that it is
regarded as excessive by other countries, this will pose an obstacle to getting the judgment
enforced. See Symposium, supra note 7, at 47–48.
168. EC Regulation, supra note 93.
169. Id. art. 2.
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shop in the United States, civil law lawyers tend to sue in the place
170
where the defendant is domiciled. Article 5(3) is an exception to the
171
general rule for tort cases. For these cases, there can be jurisdiction in
the place where the harmful event occurred. This place can be the place
172
where the act commenced or the place where damages were suffered.
In the United States, the same rule is applied according to several state
173
long-arm statutes.
However, as was earlier discussed, there is a
required constitutional test that is not present in the EC Regulation.
While in the European Union the defendant does not need to have any
contact with the forum except for the damage caused, in the United
States the defendant must have minimum contacts with the forum.
These constitutional requirements were examined in Part III.B.,
including the outline of the three-part test developed by the Ninth
174
Circuit regarding the determination of jurisdiction over nonresidents.
I believe that it is more reasonable to follow the U.S. approach.
Even if the EC Regulation is representative of all civil law tradition
rules, Article 5(3) does not reflect exactly the approaches taken by all
175
the countries belonging to this tradition.
In Mexico, for instance,
there is no similar provision, at least in civil cases, subjecting the
defendant to the jurisdiction of the place where the damage is
176
suffered.
Moreover, most of the Latin American codes of civil
procedure do not have a similar provision because they are also based
177
on the Mexican Federal Code of Civil Procedure. This is an important
consideration to resolve because, ultimately, if it is not possible to sue a
foreign defendant making available infringing materials through the
Internet, then the whole purpose of the proposed mechanism would be
useless. Therefore, the three-part test established by the Ninth Circuit
offers a good option for this proposal, and it represents an approximate
midpoint for the various standards of civil law tradition countries as
well.

170. Gardella & di Brozolo, supra note 123, at 611, 613–14.
171. EC Regulation, supra note 93, art. 5(3).
172. Id.
173. See discussion supra Part III.B.
174. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
175. EC Regulation, supra note 93, art. 5(3).
176. See generally Código Federal de Procedimientos Civiles [C.F.P.C.] [Federal Civil
Procedure Code], as amended, art. 567, Diario de la Federación [D.O.], 31 de Agosto de 1928
(Mex.).
177. See id.

BARBOSA ARTICLE

2007] INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND LITIGATION

117

Important challenges still remain, however. Civil law tradition
courts and lawyers are very formalistic. Most of them probably would
not feel comfortable with the expression “do some act or consummate
some transaction with the forum or perform some act by which he
purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the
178
forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections.”
Even if civil
law courts were comfortable with this, it is more desirable to have a
provision defining those acts more precisely. For instance, a definition
could include such things as whether one has a representative in the
forum state, whether toll-free numbers or advertisements have been
used within the forum, whether residents of the forum are engaged as
measured by the number of clicks to a Web site by those residents, or
whether commercial transactions have been performed with residents of
the forum, among others. Therefore, it would help to have defined the
“something more” required by the U.S. courts.
Article 6(1) of the EC Regulation establishes jurisdiction of a court
if one of the defendants has his or her domicile where the court is
179
located “to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments.” This multiple
defendant approach would be completely unacceptable under the U.S.
Constitution; not only does the defendant not have to have any
connection within the forum, but his actions also need not have caused
damages in the forum. Moreover, this kind of provision is an invitation
to add defendants to the suit with superfluous or trivial actions only to
choose the forum without any limit. While these provisions are
common in several civil law tradition countries and survive
constitutional challenges, they are, nevertheless, starting to disappear.
In Mexico, for example, state codes of civil procedure contain these
provisions, but the Federal Code of Civil Procedure no longer contains
180
this kind of provision. In order to make the negotiation process easier
and to avoid the risk of stagnation, I recommend that similar provisions
should be excluded from the proposal. Such provisions are not
necessary, and the risk of irreconcilable judgments does not justify its
addition because that can be satisfied by the principle of res judicata.
To illustrate this point, I will describe what I have seen in my
practice in Mexico. In order to sue an insurance company, the general
rule requires filing suit in the jurisdiction of the defendant’s domicile.

178. Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 1995); Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech.
Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1287 (9th Cir. 1977).
179. EC Regulation, supra note 93, art. 6(1).
180. See C.F.P.C. [Federal Civil Procedure Code].
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All of the insurance companies are located in Mexico City. In order to
bring jurisdiction to Monterrey, which is more than a ten-hour drive
from Mexico City, lawyers usually also sue the insurance agent.
Obviously, they do not want to recover from an individual agent and
they do not expect the judge to find the agent liable. However, because
most of the agents are locals, bringing the agent to the suit facilitates
choosing the forum. This is also true for cases other than insurance.
Obviously, the insurance company has conducted activities within the
forum that would subject it to the jurisdiction of the court under the
U.S. standard. However, Mexico does not have an equivalent rule and
the only forum for all the tort actions and some contract breach actions
is the defendant’s domicile.
There are other points of divergence that seem to be irreconcilable.
One of them is the U.S. basis for jurisdiction based on the presence of
the defendant for service. The “tag” jurisdiction is so unfamiliar to civil
law tradition countries that it would be difficult for a civil law lawyer to
181
comprehend.
Jurisdiction based on an individual’s presence in the
state long enough to be served would not help the proposed mechanism.
Also, it is not necessary because consensus has been reached in the
jurisdiction based on the place where the damages were suffered in
addition to minimum contacts that could be accepted by negotiators of
both legal traditions. Trying to adopt “tag” jurisdiction as part of the
proposed bases for an international convention on copyright litigation
would likely add unnecessary delays and controversies to negotiations.
As explained before, the doctrine of forum non conveniens, present
in common law tradition countries such as the United States, is
182
forbidden by the EC Regulation. Constitutions of countries belonging
to the civil law tradition have been influenced by the French
Revolution. This influence consists largely in a distrust of the judiciary.
Therefore, judges are confined to apply existing law to cases in an
attempt to restrain them from acting as public policy makers. However,
there are no pure civil law tradition countries because of the strong
influences of the common law tradition. For example, even in the
absence of a principle of stare decisis, judicial decisions become binding
183
in special limited cases that are called jurisprudencia. Today, at least
181. See Saad Gul, Old Rules for a New World? The Constitutional Underpinnings of
U.S. Foreign Judgment Enforcement Doctrine, 5 APPALACHIAN J.L. 67, 92 (2006) (noting that
tag jurisdiction is considered “exorbitant jurisdiction” in much of the world).
182. See supra Part III.B.
183. See, e.g., GUILLERMO CABANELLAS DE LAS CUEVAS & ELEANOR C. HOAGUE,
DICCIONARIO JURÍDICO 343 (1993). Case law is an interpretation of the law by judges,
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in Mexico, it is more common to cite a precedent in a brief or pleading
or in legal reasoning. Judges also exercise broad discretionary powers
184
when they interpret the law. However, there are still strong civil law
tradition roots in the constitutions of civil law tradition countries. To
185
illustrate this point, consider the Mexican Constitution.
There is a
constitutional obligation in Article 14 of the Mexican Constitution for
186
judges to hear all the cases filed properly before them. Therefore, if
the judge has jurisdiction according to the law, there is no room to
dismiss the case on the grounds of forum non conveniens. Otherwise,
he or she would act against the Mexican Constitution. Most civil law
tradition countries have similar provisions.
Consequently, it is
recommended that the proposed mechanism not include the forum non
187
conveniens doctrine.
Other difficulties present in the Hague Draft Convention are not
likely to be present in the enforcement mechanism. Among those
difficulties are the consumer protection measures or the disconnection
clause for the European Union already discussed. None of these are to
be included in this proposal. However, Article 5(5) of the EC
188
Regulation does limit agents within the forum to formal branches. As
discussed previously, the U.S. delegation disagreed on this point
because it would limit the activities within the forum to formal branches.
However, if, as has been proposed, the three-part test from the Ninth
Circuit is included in one way or another, then a similar provision is not
necessary for the proposed mechanism because, in this sense, the U.S.
189
approach will be taken.
In conclusion, under the proposed convention on international
copyright litigation, jurisdiction will be exercised only on the two
whereas jurisprudencia may not include all judge-made law, but rather only those decisions
emanating from the courts of Casación or the Supreme Court. Id.
184. At least, this has been the anecdotal assessment of the author through observation
and experience.
185. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [Const.], as amended,
Diario Oficial de la Federación [D.O.], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.).
186. Id. art. 14.
187. The doctrine of forum non conveniens has been considered inappropriate for
international copyright litigation: “[T]he decision compounds existing pressures on the
already fragile international copyright system. . . . Without equally strong enforcement
mechanisms, however ‘international copyrights’ [sic] continue to be of questionable value.”
Lynn Carino, Note, Creative Technology, Ltd. v. Aztech System PTE, Ltd.: The Ninth
Circuit Sends a United States Copyright Infringement Case to Singapore on a Motion of Forum
Non Conveniens, 41 VILL. L. REV. 325, 363–64 (1996).
188. EC Regulation, supra note 93, art. 5(5).
189. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
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grounds of convergence. The first is to adopt the approach of Article 2
of the EC Regulation in which persons domiciled in a Member State can
be sued in that Member State. The second basis for jurisdiction would
be to subject nonresidents conducting actions abroad with consequences
in the forum. This approach would be similar to Article 5(3) of the EC
Regulation, which establishes jurisdiction in the place where the
harmful event occurred or in the place where the damages are
190
suffered.
However, this proposal will also include U.S. principles of
191
minimum contacts as outlined in the three-part test. In order to adapt
those principles to the civil law tradition, it is recommended that cases
where such contacts were already found in U.S. cases—as measured by
representatives in the forum state, toll-free numbers, and the number of
clicks by residents of the forum, among others—be codified.
3. Preliminary Injunctions
The issue of preliminary injunctions is probably the most difficult to
resolve. As previously explained, not even in the European Union is it
possible to have injunctions issued by courts of one Member State
192
enforced in courts of another Member State.
Article 31 of the EC
Regulation mandates that the plaintiff pursue preliminary injunctions in
the place where they have to be enforced even if the Regulation, itself,
193
mandates jurisdiction in another forum.
Moreover, the European
Court of Justice has established that preliminary injunctions are not
covered by the EC Regulation because it does not cover default
judgments granted without proper service of the procedure or without
194
being summoned.
So the enforcement of a measure without service
and without a decision on the merits is quite controversial.
One simple solution is to follow the European Union approach.
This solution would include not allowing preliminary injunctions as
decrees that can be enforced under the proposed mechanism and
mandating plaintiffs to pursue those preliminary injunctions in the place
where they want to stop the infringement. If this approach is taken, a
similar provision to Article 31 of the EC Regulation should be included.
From several points of view, this would be the best solution. It seems
that it is more practical to go to a court and file a petition for a

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

EC Regulation, supra note 93, art. 5(3).
See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.A.
EC Regulation, supra note 93, art. 31.
See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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preliminary injunction based on local law and remedies than to attempt
to enforce a foreign preliminary injunction in that court. Courts usually
195
They
grant preliminary injunctions in copyright infringement cases.
know the national copyright law that incorporates the TRIPs
Agreement obligations and will issue the order arguably faster than
what would be required for a process of recognition and enforcement of
a foreign preliminary injunction. It would take longer to have a
constitutional procedure or remedy against the enforcement of an
injunction issued abroad without being served properly and without
being defeated on the merits than to have a local preliminary injunction
issued and enforced. The most comprehensive international litigation
regulation has successfully followed this approach in order to offer a
practical solution and to avoid unnecessary problems during litigation; it
196
would serve this proposal well to do likewise.
Moreover, as previously explained, almost all scholarly writing finds
it problematic for an injunction issued in one country to be enforced in
197
another country. However, the easiest way to obtain those injunctions
remains uncertain—whether to apply for the injunction in each
198
jurisdiction, as needed, or to try to enforce a foreign injunction. Even
if it is problematic to have foreign preliminary injunctions enforced in a
given court, copyright enforcement could be easier.
Technology offers copyright infringers easy methods of circulating
infringing materials at the same time they are protected against any kind
199
of legal action by traditional constitutional and territorial principles.
However, in order to harmonize the situation, it is necessary to rethink
some age-old assumptions. Any normative justification of copyrights
demands effective protection of works. This does not imply revocation
of constitutional doctrines, but rather adaptation of them to include
assumptions about territory that have been changed by technology.
An injunction issued in one country and enforced in another could
be controversial due to the lack of proper service and because the
200
defendant has not been defeated on the merits.
However, this is
exactly the same situation as local injunctions. The difference is that
195. See supra Part III.
196. EC Regulation, supra note 93, art. 31.
197. See supra note 112.
198. Rufus Pichler finds it problematic to have a preliminary judgment enforced in
another country because there has been no trial on the merits. See Symposium, supra note 7,
at 48.
199. See supra Part I.
200. See supra Part I.
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injunctions from abroad require the recognition and enforcement of a
foreign decree whose rules are the same for the enforcement of final
judgments on the merits. For instance, in the EC Regulation, the
question was not whether it allowed the enforcement of preliminary
injunctions but if those injunctions were covered by the Regulation.
This is because the procedure and the rules for enforcement cover all
types of decisions, but mostly final judgments. Obviously, the standards
to enforce a final decision on the merits require minimum rights for the
defendant, such as service of process and being defeated on the merits.
However, preliminary injunctions in copyright cases are different.
Unlike other cases where the decision on the merits could be less clear
at the beginning of litigation, much of copyright litigation concerns clear
acts of infringement, and the cost of copyright infringement is nominal.
In addition, lack of proper service and lack of a final decision on the
merits would be justified in most copyright cases because the infringer
has reasons to believe that his or her actions would have consequences
abroad; this is especially true in the case, for example, of uploading
infringing materials to the Internet where even if the alleged target of
those communications is the local market, the Internet makes those
materials automatically available around the globe.
One option for the proposed convention may include a special
procedure for preliminary injunctions, independent from the procedure
to enforce final judgments on the merits. These injunctions would not
be permanent and could include a guarantee for possible damages
caused to the defendant if he or she prevails on the merits. For this
procedure, there would be no requirements of previous service of
process or a previous decision on the merits.
Granting the preliminary injunction according to the standards of
the country where the injunction is directed is desirable. However,
201
those standards are included in Article 50(3) of the TRIPs Agreement,
202
establishing provisional measures ordered inaudita altera parte. Those
provisional measures are mandated when “any delay is likely to cause
irreparable harm to the right holder, or where there is a demonstrable

201. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 3, art. 50(3):
[T]he applicant [is] to provide any reasonably available evidence in order to satisfy
themselves with a sufficient degree of certainty that the applicant is the right holder
and that the applicant’s right is being infringed or that such infringement is
imminent, and . . . to provide a security or equivalent assurance sufficient to protect
the defendant and to prevent abuse.
202. Id. art. 50(4).
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203

risk of evidence being destroyed.”
Even if the TRIPs Agreement
establishes standards of probation in order to get a preliminary
injunction, these may differ in each country. However, such a standard
of probation could not be so different because it has to incorporate the
TRIPs Agreement obligations. For instance, the irreparable harm test
of the U.S. Copyright Act is presumed when the plaintiff clearly proves
the infringement. Generally, in most countries a preliminary injunction
is granted when the infringement is clearly proven or when there is
imminent harm. Therefore, the standard of this proposal is to be
connected with the clearness of the infringement. If the infringement is
clear, then harm must be presumed. A guarantee of escrow or another
security interest should also be included to cover possible damages
suffered by the defendant with the injunction if he or she prevails on the
merits. Article 50(4) of the TRIPs Agreement establishes that
parties affected shall be given notice, without delay after the
execution of the measures at the latest. A review, including the
right to be heard, shall take place upon request of the defendant
with a view to deciding, within a reasonable period after the
notification of the measures, whether these measures shall be
204
modified, revoked or confirmed.
The remaining question is to see whether the defendant would have the
opportunity to review the decision granting the preliminary injunction.
This could be decided by the issuing court or in the court recognizing
and enforcing that decision. The nature of these decisions requires
prompt and effective procedures. I propose that the review of these
decisions would be made by the enforcing court, even if this may create
contradictory decisions. If the plaintiff does not agree with the results,
he or she could ask the appellate court to review the defendant’s
arguments and the decision of the enforcing court. Then, this would be
the final decision on the issue of the preliminary injunction.
I propose this procedure because review by the enforcing court
establishes the expediency necessary for the procedure. To illustrate
205
this point, let me recall the case of arbitral awards in Mexico. There
are several grounds for non-recognition, and there is no appeal for the
decision of homologation. Although it is expedited in theory, it is not so
206
in practice because of the constitutional process of amparo.
If the
203. Id. art. 50(2).
204. Id. art. 50(4).
205. See supra Part I.
206. All judicial decisions are subject to the amparo, which is a constitutional review to
determine whether the decision is in accordance with the law—essentially it is a judicial
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decision is to be reviewed by the issuing court, the decision may be
enforced in Mexico, whether the case was decided in favor of the
plaintiff or the defendant, and each enforcement procedure would be
subject to amparo. However, if the review is made by the enforcing
court, the process would be simpler: one review, one appeal, and in
some cases one constitutional process. Moreover, the bail guarantee
will be less if the defendant litigates the issue of the preliminary
injunction in his or her home court rather than abroad.
Another option would be to hold this review in the forum of the
issuing court. This possibility should also be considered to avoid
interfering with the normal procedures of the issuing court. However,
this option would make it more difficult for the defendant to defend his
or her rights and more expensive to guarantee bail. The former option
of having the review process in the enforcing court is more like the
European approach in which the preliminary injunction has to be
granted by the court located in the place where the plaintiff wants to
stop the infringement. Because the TRIPs Agreement has somewhat
harmonized other standards to grant those preliminary injunctions, the
result would be more certain.
Enforcement of the injunction is the first step of the procedure. The
service of process could be given at this stage by the court enforcing the
preliminary injunction. In the forum court, the defendant could then
litigate all the issues, the preliminary injunction, and the merits of the
case; however, this could be unnecessary as some jurisdictions do not
have such formal requirements for service of process and service could
be done by any individual.
And so for preliminary injunctions, there are three possible
solutions. One is to follow the European Union approach, which has
been tested for several years. This approach requests that the
preliminary injunction occur in the court of the place where the
infringement has taken place. The second approach is to have those
decisions issued by the forum court and then enforced by the addressed
court, which would review such decisions if the defendant files a petition
for revision. And the third possibility is similar to the second, but the
review is done by the issuing court.

assessment of constitutionality provided for under Mexico’s Constitution. Constitución
Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [Const.], as amended, arts. 103, 107, Diario Oficial
de la Federación [D.O.], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.).
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4. Applicable Law
207

The issue of applicable law was examined in Part III. Ultimately,
determining the applicable law is more a question of the place of
infringement, but it should be reasonable. According to the Berne
Convention, the applicable law is the law of the place where the
208
infringement took place.
Nevertheless, courts should have a wide
range of discretion to determine the place of infringement and,
consequently, the applicable law. However, courts should make this
choice of law reasonable in order to avoid having their judgments
declared against the public policy of the place where the enforcement is
sought.
5. Grounds for Non-Recognition
The idea of having grounds for non-recognition implies that the
plaintiff has the right of recognition and enforcement unless one of the
grounds for non-recognition is met. The grounds for non-recognition
are restrictive in their nature. Nothing more than the enumerated
grounds should be the basis for an addressing court to deny recognition
and enforcement. The defendant has exercised his or her defenses in
the forum where the litigation took place, and he or she was defeated in
the first instance and on appeal. These grounds for non-recognition are
not supposed to be the bases for re-litigation of the issue.
I will enumerate the grounds for non-recognition of the U.S.
Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, the Mexican
Federal Code of Civil Procedure, and those enumerated in the EC
Regulation. The grounds for non-recognition under the U.S. Uniform
Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act and the Mexican Federal
Code of Civil Procedure are similar in that both are based on comity
and reciprocity and are not the implementation of an international
209
agreement on recognition of foreign judgments. In contrast, the EC
Regulation does not need to deal with questions of reciprocity because
there is a legal obligation for all Member States to recognize and
210
enforce the judgments of other Member States. Consequently, the EC
Regulation is more restrictive in its grounds for non-recognition. It has

207. See supra Part III.
208. See supra note 79.
209. See Código Federal de Procedimientos Civiles [C.F.P.C.] [Federal Civil Procedure
Code], 1 de Septiembre de 1932 (Mex.); UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION
ACT, 13 U.L.A. 43 (2002).
210. EC Regulation, supra note 93, art. 31.
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only four grounds for non-recognition while the U.S. and Mexican
211
counterparts allow for additional opportunities.
The U.S. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws and the American Bar Association adopted the Uniform Foreign
212
Money-Judgments Recognition Act in 1962. This uniform act is to be
implemented by state legislatures and codifies existing common law
principles on recognition and enforcement of certain kinds of foreign
judgments. As its name establishes, it covers only final judgments on
the merits granting the recovery of a sum of money other than
213
judgments for taxes, fines, other penalties, or family matters.
It is
214
applicable even if there is a pending appeal and has three mandatory
grounds for non-recognition and six discretionary grounds for non215
recognition.
If the foreign judgment does not fulfill any of these
grounds for non-recognition, it will receive a treatment equivalent to
216
sister state judgments.
The three mandatory grounds for nonrecognition include: (1) lack of impartial tribunal or having procedures
217
incompatible to due process of law, (2) lack of personal jurisdiction,
218
and (3) lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The six discretionary grounds for non-recognition are the following:
(1) the defendant did not receive notice of the proceedings, (2) the
judgment was obtained by fraud, (3) the judgment violates state public
policy, (4) the judgment conflicts with another final judgment, (5) the
proceeding was contrary to the parties’ agreement, or (6) the

211. Id.
212. UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, 13 U.L.A. 43 (2002).
213. Id. § 1(2).
214. Id. § 2.
215. Id. § 4.
216. Id. § 7.
217. Lack of personal jurisdiction shall not be cause to refuse enforcement of a foreign
judgment if:
(1) the defendant was served personally in the foreign state; (2) the defendant
voluntarily appeared in the proceedings . . . ; (3) the defendant prior to
the . . . proceedings had agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the foreign court with
respect to the subject matter involved; (4) the defendant was domiciled in the
foreign state when the proceedings were instituted, or . . . had its principal place of
business . . . incorporated . . . or had . . . corporate status, in the foreign state; (5) the
defendant had a business office in the foreign state and the proceedings . . . involved
a . . . [claim] arising out of business done . . . through that office in the foreign state;
or (6) the defendant operated a motor vehicle or airplane in the foreign state and
the proceedings involved a . . . claim for relief arising out of such operation.
Id. § 5.
218. Id. § 4.
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jurisdiction was based only on personal service and the forum was
219
Several states also have another
seriously problematic for the trial.
discretionary ground for non-recognition and require that the judgment
220
come from a country granting the same reciprocal enforcement rights.
On the other hand, the Mexican Federal Code of Civil Procedure
establishes the procedure in which a foreign judgment could be
221
enforced.
Article 564 establishes that the jurisdiction of the forum
court rendering the judgment should be in accordance with compatible
222
provisions of the Code, itself.
Therefore, as already mentioned, for
copyright infringement actions the only acceptable jurisdiction is for the
court of the domicile of the defendant. Article 566 establishes that
jurisdiction agreed to by the parties before the commencement of the
223
proceedings is acceptable. However, Article 567 establishes that such
agreement in the forum is not going to be valid when one of the parties
224
had no opportunity to negotiate the issue.
Article 571 establishes the grounds for recognition; there are no
225
grounds for non-recognition. Therefore, contrary to the European or
U.S. provisions, in Mexico there is a presumption of no enforcement
unless the judgment complies with the grounds for recognition. Those
grounds are the following: (1) the judgment has complied with the
formalities established for foreign interrogatory letters, (2) the
procedure does not deal with real actions, (3) jurisdiction was exercised
according to the Mexican Federal Civil Procedure Code, (4) the
defendant has been notified or served with process, (5) the judgment is
res judicata in the country that rendered it, (6) the action is not subject
to another suit still pending in Mexico or in which a definite judgment is
rendered, (7) the judgment is not contrary to the Mexican public policy,
226
and (8) the judgment fulfills the authenticity requirements. The same
provision also establishes the reciprocity requirement and gives the
227
judge discretion to require evidence of such reciprocity.

219. Id.
220. See EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS § 24.36 n.1 (3d ed. 2000).
221. Código Federal de Procedimientos Civiles [C.F.P.C.] [Federal Civil Procedure
Code], Diario de la Federación [D.O.], 1 de Septiembre de 1932 (Mex.).
222. Id. art. 564.
223. Id. art. 566.
224. Id. art. 567.
225. Id. art. 571.
226. Id.
227. Id.
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The Mexican standards for recognition of a judgment are not the
ideal standards to follow for the proposed mechanism because they
require limited grounds for non-recognition and too few grounds and
formalistic requirements for recognition. The standards for recognition
limit the exercise of jurisdiction of the foreign court to the Mexican
approaches. In copyright infringement cases, this indicates that if the
infringer is domiciled in Mexico, with no assets in another place, he or
she will be immune to the enforcement of a judgment rendered in any
foreign court. Therefore, this is not the path to follow for the proposed
mechanism.
Having enumerated the grounds for non-recognition under U.S. law
and under Mexican law, I will next explain the grounds for nonrecognition under the EC Regulation. Article 33 establishes that a
“judgment given in a Member State shall be recognised in the other
228
Member States without any special procedure.”
There are only four
grounds for non-recognition established in Article 34. The grounds for
non-recognition are as follows: (1) when the recognition is manifestly
against public policy of the Member State in which recognition is
sought, (2) when there are default judgments or if the defendant was not
served properly, (3) when the judgment is already decided in the
Member State in which recognition is sought, and (4) when the
judgment was already decided in another Member State or in a third
state and the earlier judgment can be enforced in the Member State in
229
which recognition is sought.
There are fewer grounds for non-recognition because Member
States are already bound by the same regulation covering almost all the
possible issues that may arise during international litigation. For the
proposed mechanism, I will provide grounds for non-recognition based
on the nature of the proposed mechanism and also the nature of the
different backgrounds of the analyzed regulations. I will take the
grounds for non-recognition of the U.S. law and those established by the
EC Regulation and adapt them to copyright litigation.
The U.S. grounds for non-recognition based on impartial tribunals
will not be included in the proposed mechanism because states signing
the proposed mechanism will recognize that, in other Member States,
there are impartial tribunals and also proceedings complying with due
process requirements. For the other two U.S. mandatory grounds for
non-recognition, the proposed mechanism has its own allowed basis for
228. EC Regulation, supra note 93, art. 33.
229. Id. art. 34.
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jurisdiction. In this respect, a ground for non-recognition would be met
if the jurisdiction was taken on a basis not provided by the enforcement
mechanism.
All the discretionary U.S. grounds for non-recognition contain
almost the same grounds as in the EC Regulation, except for number
six, which denies recognition if the jurisdiction was based on service of
230
process and the forum was not convenient. Because jurisdiction based
on service is not allowed under the proposed mechanism, it is not
necessary to include such a ground for non-recognition.
For this mechanism, judgments will be recognized and enforced
unless they meet one of the mechanism’s grounds for non-recognition.
The procedure of recognition and enforcement will be as simple as
possible and the purpose of the procedure will be only to check if there
is a ground for non-recognition. The defendant must receive notice of
the procedure in order to invoke one or more grounds for nonrecognition, if they exist. Addressing courts will have discretionary
powers to see if there is a ground for non-recognition that was not
invoked by the defendant. The grounds for non-recognition for the
proposed mechanism are as follows:
1) If the judgment is about a litigation not covered by the
litigation mechanism: an infringement action;
2) If the judgment is based on a jurisdiction not covered by the
proposed mechanism;
3) If the defendant was not served with process properly
providing notice of the proceeding;
4) If the judgment was obtained by fraud;
5) If the judgment conflicts with another final judgment
enforceable under the terms of the proposed mechanism in
the addressed state;
6) If the proceeding is contrary to an arbitral clause between the
parties, agreed to before the commencement of the
proceedings; or
7) If such enforcement is against the public policy of the state in
which recognition is sought.
These grounds for non-recognition are not divided between mandatory
and discretionary. They all have the same weight, and it is expected that
the judge will exercise discretion in order to comply with the proposed

230. UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, 13 U.L.A. 43 (2002).
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mechanism, which, if negotiations succeed, will be an international
treaty.
6. Revisiting the Basic Proposed Rules
Again, the proposed mechanism has three paths, each independent
of the other. What follows is a brief enumeration of the rules of the first
and most important proposed path.
The scope of the proposed mechanism covers all the questions
arising from an infringement action, including succession of rights or
ownership, if necessary. There are two allowed bases for jurisdiction:
(1) persons domiciled in a Member State can be sued in that Member
State, and (2) nonresidents conducting actions with consequences in the
forum can be sued in that forum, providing that U.S. principles of
minimum contacts are applied. It is additionally recommended that
these principles be codified for the proposed mechanism.
For preliminary injunctions there are three possible solutions. One
is to follow the European Union approach, consisting of the application
of the preliminary injunction in the court where the infringement is
taking place. The second solution is to have the decisions issued by the
forum court and then enforced by the addressed court, which will review
such decisions if the defendant files a petition for review. The third
possibility is similar to the second, but the review would be done by the
issuing court.
The applicable law is the law of the place where the infringement is
taking place. However, courts should have wide discretion to determine
the place of infringement and, consequently, the applicable law. They
have to be reasonable, otherwise the judgments could be deemed as
contrary to the public policy of the country in which enforcement is
sought. And seven grounds for non-recognition will be available to be
applied by judges with reasonable discretion.
B. Comity and Reciprocity
This is the second path of the proposed mechanism. In case there is
a failure of negotiations with respect to the proposed convention on
copyright litigation, as outlined in the primary proposal of this Article,
the parties would have to litigate with the existing means of
231
enforcement.
Trying to enforce a judgment from an infringement
231. Obviously, the proposed mechanism is the best option. Even without an
enforcement convention, it has been suggested that enforcing foreign judgments is more cost
effective; an enforcement convention would enhance those benefits. See Mark D. Rosen,
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action under the U.S. Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act or
the Mexican Federal Code of Civil Procedure, for example, is more
232
The first difference is
difficult than under the proposed mechanism.
that preliminary injunctions are not covered by any of those laws, but
this is the most minimal difference. Questions of public policy against
the choice of law made by the rendering court and questions about the
exercise of jurisdiction are the threshold problems. This part of the
Article includes an analysis of the appropriate basis for copyright
judgments to facilitate enforcement under existing law without any new
convention.
Taking into consideration the impact of the TRIPs Agreement, one
may assert that most of the infringements occurring abroad are also
actionable under the respective foreign law. For instance, the sale of
pirated or counterfeit CDs in flea markets is actionable in a civil action
under the copyright law of most of the countries belonging to the TRIPs
Agreement. The same can be established for sharing music over the
Internet—an act that cannot be considered mere copying for private
purposes, but rather is an act of unauthorized transmission to the public.
Due to the difficulties in enforcing local judgments abroad, I suggest
two steps in order to get those judgments enforced. The first is the
application of the copyright law of the place where the protection is
sought, meaning the law of the place where the infringement is taking
place. The second is to avoid exercising an exorbitant jurisdiction or a
jurisdiction not recognized or accepted by the addressed country.
The first option, consisting of the application of the law of the place
where the infringement takes place, is the easiest to achieve because of
the availability of remedies among the TRIPs Agreement Member
States. Moreover, in most civil law tradition countries, international
treaties like the TRIPs Agreement or the Berne Convention are selfexecuting, and in cases when the international treaty establishes rights
to be implemented by national legislatures, those implementations have
to be in accordance with the international treaty; otherwise, the
provisions of the treaty prevail.
However, an important omission can cause the entire mechanism to
fail. None of the international copyright agreements provide for

Should Un-American Foreign Judgments Be Enforced?, 88 MINN. L. REV. 783, 805 (2004).
232. Some scholars have noted that the fact that the United States does not have a
federal statute for enforcement of foreign judgments may cause difficulties for American
litigants attempting to demonstrate reciprocity when trying to enforce U.S. judgments
abroad. See Gul, supra note 181, at 68.
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secondary liability, namely contributory or vicarious infringement.
Therefore, when an action is brought against an Internet service
provider (ISP) located in a state whose laws do not provide for such
secondary liability, the best option would probably be to consider those
233
secondary acts as direct infringing activities. For instance, in Mexico,
a company like Napster could not be held liable under contributory or
vicarious infringement because there is no such legal development
234
under Mexican Copyright Law.
In countries where there is no such legal development, general rules
235
of torts established in the civil code can be invoked in order to hold
persons who cause damages in common by committing a tortious act
236
liable. This is called joint liability. Nevertheless, there is no certainty
in the outcome and it is more desirable to have expressly established
secondary liability in the copyright laws or, at least, broadly recognized
by case law.
Under Mexican and French laws, notions of criminal complicity may
237
grant a remedy for secondary liability.
However, not all infringement
cases are considered crimes under both laws, and criminal offenses are
not part of the proposed mechanism. The proposed mechanism is
simply an attempt to stop actual infringements abroad by using either
civil courts or administrative agencies. The first and the second
proposed options are to be applied in civil courts, and the last one is for
an administrative agency.
The application of the copyright law of the place where the
infringement took place may reduce the remedies available under
domestic law. However, it is better to have at least one remedy than to
not have a remedy at all. The primary goal is to stop acts of
infringement as cheaply and simply as possible. Certainly, it would not

233. See J.A.L. STERLING, WORLD COPYRIGHT LAW 513 (2d ed. 2003).
234. For additional analysis of this point, see Roberto Garza Barbosa, Derechos de
Autor, Derechos Conexos y Nuevas Tecnologías. ¿Cómo Adaptar Antiguos Principios a la
Era Digital?, 12 IUSTITIA 263, 283 (2005).
235. For instance, Article 1917 of the Mexican Federal Civil Procedure Code establishes
that “[t]hose persons that jointly have caused damages, are jointly liable to the victim and are
bound to restore according to dispositions of this chapter.”
Código Federal de
Procedimientos Civiles [C.F.P.C.] [Federal Civil Procedure Code], art. 1917, Diario de la
Federación [D.O.], 1 de Septiembre de 1932 (Mex.) (translated by author). But note that
there is no case law applying this principle to copyright law.
236. Under French law, for example, the liability based on Article 1382 of the French
Civil Code establishes that a person who causes damage is bound to make repairs. CODE
CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1382 (Fr.).
237. STERLING, supra note 233.

BARBOSA ARTICLE

2007] INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND LITIGATION

133

be as cost effective and efficient, for example, as the ICANN Dispute
Resolution Policy because the issue here is not dealing with domain
names granted only by registrars subjecting all the registries to the
238
ICANN Dispute Resolution Policy. And unlike cybersquatting in the
domain name system, copyright infringement involves a wide range of
activities in different mediums regulated by different copyright laws.
However, this alternative is one option that may reduce the great
difference between the minimum effort needed to infringe a copyright
and the huge expense and effort to enforce rights over those infringed
copyrights.
The second element, consisting of the avoidance of jurisdiction, is
more difficult because the basis for jurisdiction varies in each legal
system, even if they are from the same legal tradition. For instance,
Article 5(3) of the EC Regulation establishes that jurisdiction can be
established “in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the
239
courts for the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur.”
However, not all civil law tradition countries have provisions similar to
Article 5(3) of the EC Regulation. In Mexico and some other legal
systems of Latin America, jurisdiction can be established only in the
defendant’s domicile and not in the place where the damages were
suffered. As already explained, the Mexican Federal Civil Procedure
Code establishes that foreign judgments will be recognized if the
exercise of jurisdiction of the issuing court is “compatible or analogous”
with national principles, unless there is no other court with jurisdiction
240
to hear the case. There is no case law regarding the meaning of the
terms “compatible or analogous,” but it is very likely that such terms
will be interpreted with similar meanings. Therefore, foreign judgments
and decrees will be enforced if jurisdiction is exercised under rules
similar to those contained in the Federal Civil Procedure Code. As a
consequence, if the jurisdiction of foreign courts on infringement cases
is one other than the domicile of the defendant, it is very unlikely that
judgments and orders based on this jurisdiction will be enforced in
Mexico.
However, Article 565 establishes that jurisdiction not analogous or
compatible with the statute will be recognized if the foreign court
chooses that jurisdiction in order to avoid denegation of justice or

238. See
ICANN,
Uniform
Domain-Name
Dispute-Resolution
http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp.htm (last visited Dec. 15, 2006).
239. EC Regulation, supra note 93, art. 5(3).
240. C.F.P.C. [Federal Civil Procedure Code], arts. 554, 571-III.
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because there was no other court to hear the case.
But this precept
does not establish whether such reasons have to be implicitly or
explicitly in the judgment. Foreign courts are not likely to explicitly
242
establish exercise of jurisdiction for those explained reasons.
However, it can be assumed that a court always takes jurisdiction to
hear a case because otherwise there would be a denegation of justice.
This is one of the most difficult issues of trying to enforce a
judgment with the existing means. The judgment taken in one
jurisdiction may not be recognized by the court whose enforcement is
sought. For all of these reasons, this path of the mechanism is the least
243
likely to be useful. It simply reflects the actual situation and how one
can attenuate it.
C. Reliance on Administrative Procedures
There is an alternative option to stop the infringing activity. Even
without legal change, the mechanism of enforcement can be based on
administrative cooperation.
In Mexico, almost all remedies for
copyright infringement cases are issued by the Mexican Institute of the
Industrial Property (IMPI), which is an administrative agency created
244
by the Mexican Industrial Property Act. Article 234 of the Mexican
Copyright Act empowers the IMPI faculties to enforce remedies for
245
copyright infringements.
Those administrative infringements are
independent from civil actions to recover damages.
In the
administrative procedure, there is no recovery of damages, only
injunctions to stop the infringement. The plaintiff may apply for an
administrative remedy, or he or she may sue in federal or state courts in
246
order to recover damages. Moreover, the plaintiff may apply first in
the IMPI and then in a court that has jurisdiction. Even if the IMPI, in
the administrative procedure, establishes that there is no infringement,
the copyright holder may sue in court because both actions are different:

241. Id. art. 565.
242. See id.
243. However, it has been suggested that as global trade continues to grow, there will be
increasing need for international judicial assistance based on comity.
See Okezie
Chukwumerije, International Judicial Assistance: Revitalizing Section 1782, 37 GEO. WASH.
INT’L L. REV. 649, 650 (2005).
244. Ley de la Propiedad Industrial [L.P.I.] [Industrial Property Act], as amended, art.
6, Diario Oficial de la Federación [D.O.], 27 de Junio de 1991 (Mex.).
245. C.F.P.C. [Federal Civil Procedure Code], art. 234.
246. Ley Federal del Derecho de Autor [L.F.D.A.] [Federal Copyright Act], art. 213,
Diario Oficial de la Federación [D.O.], 24 de Diciembre de 1996 (Mex.).
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one is administrative, and the other is a civil action to recover
247
damages.
The proposed mechanism may use the administrative procedure
taken by the IMPI. The advantage of the use of IMPI proceedings is
precisely IMPI’s expertise. The Mexican judiciary is not familiar with
248
copyright cases, but the IMPI is a specialized agency for those cases.
It can enforce remedies, like preliminary injunctions, more effectively
than remedies available under the Federal Civil Procedure Code. It is
also common in developing countries to centralize enforcement of
intellectual property procedures in an administrative agency in order to
have more efficient remedies. Admittedly, this can be related to several
deficiencies in the judicial system, but this is not the issue of this
investigation. This is one of the reasons why Article 49 of the TRIPs
Agreement establishes the following:
To the extent that any civil remedy can be ordered as a result of
administrative procedures on the merits of a case, such
procedures shall conform to principles equivalent on substance
249
to those set forth in this Section.
Therefore, the provisional measures directed by Article 50 to
judicial authorities can be exercised by administrative agencies like the
250
IMPI. Articles 203 through 212 of the Industrial Property Act give the
IMPI a wide range of tools ranging from surveillance, to visits, to the
251
forfeiture of infringing goods.
The IMPI may order a visit to the
252
premises where the infringing activities supposedly took place. Those
provisions are the implementation of the TRIPs Agreement civil and
administrative procedures and remedies. According to Article 203 of
the Industrial Property Act, those proceedings may be commenced by a
253
petition of a copyright holder or ex officio at the initiative of the IMPI.

247. FERNANDO SERRANO MIGALLÓN, NUEVA LEY FEDERAL DEL DERECHO DE
AUTOR 147 (1998).
248. The same situation occurs in trademark infringement actions. Litigants usually
look first at IMPI rather than civil judicial remedies. See Hedwig A. Lindner López,
Trademark Enforcement in Mexico, 8 CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J. 74, 77 (1999). But note
that the author analyzes IMPI’s administrative procedures and criminal remedies but does
not mention civil judicial remedies.
249. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 3, art. 49.
250. See id. art. 50.
251. Ley de la Propiedad Industrial [L.P.I.] [Industrial Property Act], as amended, arts.
202–212, Diario Oficial de la Federación [D.O.], 27 de Junio de 1991 (Mex.).
252. Id.
253. Id. art. 203.
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Consequently, if it is not possible to enforce a preliminary injunction
issued abroad due to an exercise of jurisdiction not recognized by the
Federal Civil Procedure Code, then the preliminary measure may be
enforced by the IMPI. In this case, the procedure taken by the IMPI
will not be a procedure of recognition and enforcement of a foreign
judgment or decree, but rather an independent procedure started by a
254
petition of the issuing foreign court.
It is advantageous because it
takes only a single specialized federal agency with jurisdiction to act all
over the country.
Consequently, after receiving those foreign
injunctions electronically, the IMPI starts an independent administrative
procedure that will stop the infringement.
Each country will have to establish a central office for contact that is
going to be the channel to send and receive those preliminary
injunctions. The most convenient situation is for this authority to be an
administrative agency like the IMPI, the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO), or the United States Copyright Office. In
countries where these kinds of administrative agencies do not have the
power to independently act on enforcement procedures, their work will
consist of redirecting the orders to the appropriate court to hold
enforcement proceedings according to the first path previously
discussed. In countries where the administrative agency has those
powers, the most convenient measure would be to start their own
administrative procedures in order to prevent further infringements. If
this is the case, special consideration must be given to the injunction of
the foreign issuing court in order to avoid inconsistent results. It is
important to clarify that this possible path is going to be used more
frequently in developing countries where most of the piracy occurs. In
those countries, it is common to have an administrative authority
enforcing remedies for copyrights.
Proceedings taken by those
administrative authorities are usually more efficient than court
proceedings. This is the principal reason why those administrative
agencies have this type of enforcement authority.
Exporting countries rely on court proceedings to enforce intellectual
property rights instead of administrative proceedings. Those countries
usually have the appropriate judicial structure in order to have those
rights enforced. Importing countries usually have inefficiencies in their
judicial systems and the alternative is the creation of administrative
agencies like the IMPI. Therefore, this third path of the proposed
mechanism is conceived with this assumption.
254. Id.
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If a district court in the United States grants a preliminary injunction
against a Mexican resident in order to stop an infringement over the
Internet through a home page hosted in a server located in Mexico, the
proposed mechanism will work as follows. First, a U.S. district court
will redirect its injunctive order to the American office of contact,
perhaps the USPTO or the Copyright Office. Then the office of contact
will redirect that order electronically to the designated Mexican office of
contact, the IMPI. In this case, the defendant is not a U.S. resident and,
therefore, it is probable that Mexican courts would not recognize the
grounds for jurisdiction of the U.S. court. Thus, the way to overcome
this difficulty would be to have an administrative proceeding started by
the IMPI—the result being that the infringement is stopped.
The negotiation and implementation of the third path of the
proposed mechanism is simple. It can be negotiated among different
countries by an international treaty or as a mechanism of cooperation
without an international treaty. Developing countries using this
mechanism have the advantage that local copyright holders do not
have—they do not have to compete with cheaper, foreign, unprotected
materials. The advantage of having a less expensive way to stop
infringement over the Internet and other technological mediums should
encourage different countries to apply this mechanism.
VI. PROBABLE EXTRATERRITORIAL EFFECTS AND A PUBLIC CHOICE
DEMOCRACY PERSPECTIVE
There are several issues that have to be addressed or considered in
the process of negotiating the enforcement mechanism. These issues
are related to certain consequences the mechanism will produce. There
are questions, not only of transnational enforcement, but also of
probable recognition of higher copyright protection standards from one
country to another. As can be expected, copyright exporting countries
like the United States have a more rigorous copyright act than countries
that are copyright importers. For instance, severe statutory damages,
like those available under the U.S. law, are not present in Latin
American countries.
Even if this mechanism has clear rules about jurisdiction and choice
of law, courts would probably apply their own domestic law to acts
occurring abroad. For example, the law of the United States—a
copyright exporter country—would be applied to foreign defendants
engaging in activities through the Internet. The place of infringement
would tend to be declared as occurring within the United States, and
this argument, though reasonable, would ignore the choice of law rules
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proposed in this mechanism. If this is the case, and the rules of
jurisdiction and choice of law of the proposed mechanism do not
prevent the generalized application of U.S. law or the law of another
exporting copyright country to acts occurring in another Member State,
two problems would arise. First, the expansion of copyright protection
always brings benefits and costs. The legislature of one country needs
to balance these costs and benefits among represented players and
voters of the legislative process, otherwise it may face the consequences
in the next election. However, if the cost of increasing copyright
protection is paid by foreign non-voters, the result could be the unjust
raising of copyright protection at the cost of foreigners who are not
represented in the legislature. While the harmonization provides some
answers, differences among copyright statutes remain.
Thus,
harmonization is not enough to solve this issue.
The differences are principally related to the term of protection,
statutory damages, and the availability of secondary liability under
several jurisdictions.
There is another proposed convention on
intellectual property litigation that was outlined by Professors Rochelle
255
C. Dreyfuss and Jane C. Ginsburg (Dreyfuss & Ginsburg proposal). I
bring up this proposed convention in order to explain how it deals with
the issues discussed in this section. While the proposed mechanism is
not going to deal with these problems in the same way, it is illustrative
to analyze how other proposals deal with these problems. Unlike the
proposed mechanism, which is designed only for copyright infringement
litigation, the Dreyfuss & Ginsburg proposal deals with all intellectual
property litigation, including patent and trademark litigation as well as
256
other non-infringement actions.
It is not similar to this proposed
mechanism because it has different rules and a different background. It
is based on the failed Hague Draft Convention; however, it includes
several specific provisions for intellectual property matters, and
surprisingly, unlike the Hague Draft Convention, it provides for the
257
It does, however, use the same
doctrine of forum non conveniens.
approach of the failed Hague Draft Convention regarding preliminary
258
injunctions.

255. See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction
and Recognition of Judgments in Intellectual Property Matters, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1065
(2002).
256. See id. at 1066.
257. Id. at 1131.
258. See id. at 1132.
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Unlike my proposed mechanism, the Dreyfuss & Ginsburg proposal
has a specific ground for non-recognition for cases where the choice of
law is arbitrary or unreasonable. As already mentioned, the mechanism
this Article proposes deals with this problem under other more general
grounds for non-recognition applicable to judgments that are against the
public policy of the place where recognition is sought. As mentioned
before, if the judgment was based on a choice of law that was
unreasonable or arbitrary, it could be against the public policy of the
place whose enforcement is sought.
It is interesting, however, to note that for the Dreyfuss & Ginsburg
proposal, a reasonable choice of law for Internet infringement cases is
the law of the place where the operator has its residence or principal
place of business, or if the infringing materials are not found on a Web
site, like peer-to-peer technology, the reasonable applicable law is the
law of the principal place of business or residence of the person that
initiated communications. Furthermore, in the latter case, the proposed
convention refers to the place where peer-to-peer communication is
initiated and not the place where the distributor of peer-to-peer
software has its residence. As an exception to this general rule, it also
provides for the law of the place that has the most significant
relationship with the controversy, for example, the law of the principal
target of the infringing activities. If the infringing activities target
different countries, the laws of those different countries are going to be
applied to the portion of infringing activities conducted in each specific
country.
Those specific provisions regarding choice of law and remedies seem
to provide the proposed convention’s answer to the issues discussed in
this section. While they are a guide, I think that courts must decide the
choice of law based on the place of infringement as considered by
internal substantive legislation.
The rationale for my proposed
mechanism consists of the acceptance of the choice of law rule
contained in the Berne Convention:
the law of the place of
259
infringement. Therefore, courts will decide the place of infringement
in a reasonable way. If courts undertake this analysis about the place of
infringement lightly, they will threaten the enforcement of the
judgment. An example of a good determination of the place of
infringement could be the place where the infringement materials were
downloaded or uploaded by others.

259. See Berne Convention, supra note 75, art. 5(2).
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As for the question of remedies, the Dreyfuss & Ginsburg proposal
establishes that statutory damages are allowed, even based on statutory
amounts rather than proof of actual damages. The enforcing court may
260
order injunctive relief, but it is limited to its territory.
However, I consider that all the provisions intended to deal with the
inappropriate application of foreign copyright standards seem
insufficient in the context of the Dreyfuss & Ginsburg proposal because
it has exorbitant bases for jurisdiction:
1. A plaintiff may bring an infringement action in the courts
of—
a. any State where defendant substantially acted (including
preparatory acts) in furtherance of the alleged infringement, or
b. any State to which the alleged infringement was
intentionally directed, including those States for which defendant
took no reasonable steps to avoid acting in or directing activity to
that State, or
c. any State in which the alleged infringement foreseeably
occurred unless the defendant took reasonable steps to avoid
acting in or directing activity to that State.
2. If an action is brought in the courts of a State only on the
basis of the intentional direction of the alleged infringement to
that State, then those courts shall have jurisdiction only in
respect to the injury arising out of unauthorized use occurring in
that State, unless the injured person has his habitual residence or
principal place of business in that State.
3. If an action is brought in the courts of a State only on the
basis of the occurrence of the infringement in that State, then
those courts shall have jurisdiction only in respect to the injury
261
arising out of unauthorized use occurring in that State.
As already mentioned, the mechanism this Article proposes has only
two allowed bases for the exercise of jurisdiction: (1) persons domiciled
in a Member State can be sued in that Member State, and (2)
nonresidents conducting actions with consequences in the forum can be
sued in that forum, provided that U.S. principles of minimum contacts
are applied. It is recommended to have these principles codified.
Therefore, having the U.S. requirements of minimum contact in order
to exercise jurisdiction makes the proposed mechanism applicable to
fewer cases than the other proposed convention. Under the other

260. See Dreyfuss & Ginsburg, supra note 255, at 1072.
261. Id. at 1077.
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proposed convention, jurisdiction may be exercised everywhere.
Because the Internet may enable the infringement of protected works
around the globe, the defendant under sub-section (1)(c) of the
Dreyfuss & Ginsburg proposal is supposed to foresee that the
infringement may occur everywhere. If this rule were applicable today,
all Internet Web pages would be subject to the jurisdiction of every
court around the world, despite no other contact with the forum other
than the Web page being available to residents of that forum.
Admittedly, although the proposed mechanism here is less ambitious
and more cautious than the Dreyfuss & Ginsburg proposal, it still does
not resolve all the issues discussed in this section. Several possible
answers are offered to solve these problems. During the process of
negotiating the proposed mechanism, all of the answers can be applied.
The first solution is related to issues of choice of law. If the person
who is engaged in what is considered an infringing activity in the forum
country takes the necessary technical measures to avoid making those
materials available in that forum, he or she would be insulated from the
application of the law of that forum. In other words, if a Mexican
operator has a Web page with protected works and takes the necessary
technical steps in order to avoid that those materials would be accessible
in the United States, then the applicable law would be the Mexican
Copyright Act, not that of the United States. The distribution of those
materials would probably not be an infringement under the Mexican
Copyright Act. The same rule would be applicable if the Web page
does not contain infringing materials, but instead peer-to-peer software
or similar devices. Note that this is a rule of choice of law and not a rule
related to jurisdiction because the jurisdictional bases for the proposed
mechanism are limited to those already mentioned.
The second answer is to either limit remedies to those available in
the place where recognition is sought or to limit the damages to actual
262
damages. This is similar to the other proposed convention.
Under
this rule, the enforcing judge of a judgment containing U.S. statutory
damages would reduce the awards to damages available in the place
where the enforcement is sought. This is an appealing rule; however,
there is another alternative. Under the U.S. Copyright Act, the
precondition to obtaining statutory damages is to have the work
registered in the Copyright Office prior to the infringement or, in case
263
of published works, within three months of their publication.
The
262. See id. at 1065.
263. 2 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 15, ch. USA §
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recovery of those statutory damages in a third country may be
conditioned on the registry of the work in that country. The
determination of whether the work is registered in the country in which
the enforcement is sought can be made either by the forum court or by
the court whose enforcement is sought. This would not be in violation
of the Berne Convention non-formality requirement because statutory
damages are outside the scope of the Berne Convention. For the same
reason, in the negotiation process of the mechanism, the parties may
determine to set those statutory damages outside the proposed
mechanism. Therefore, this second solution would be to reduce the
statutory damages to those available in the country where the
enforcement is sought, to subject those statutory damages to the
registration of the work in that country, or to exclude statutory damages
from the mechanism.
The third answer is that this mechanism would have a withdrawal
provision making it simple for affected countries to resign from the
convention containing the proposed mechanism.
As mentioned
previously, the legislative process of increasing copyright protection
always has benefits and costs. While some copyright holders may enjoy
the benefits of the increased protection, others must pay the costs for it.
Legislators would be cautious not to burden foreign non-voters with
those costs because their representatives could withdraw from the
convention.
While any convention of this kind may cause members to relinquish
some aspects of their sovereignty, all the members of the proposed
mechanism would have the same obligations. However, from a practical
point of view, it seems that the proposed mechanism would serve only
the interests of developed countries, and developing countries would be
faced with surrendering sovereignty in exchange for nothing. The
reason for this argument is that developed countries are the major
producers of protected works. A net importer copyright country has no
reason to enter into the kind of agreements that favor copyright holders
unless it can expect something in exchange.
If a country protects foreign works, it will obtain two favorable
results in exchange: the protection of its nationals’ works abroad and a
market in which national authors and copyright holders do not have to
compete with cheaper unprotected foreign works. Even if this is a
persuasive argument, it becomes less persuasive when there are
countries that have minimal or no production of protected works, in
5[3][a].
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contrast to other countries that produce almost all the existing
copyrighted materials around the globe. Therefore, there should be
more benefits for net importer countries, if they are to accept the
264
proposed mechanism.
The proposed mechanism can be a tool to promote the creation of
protected works in order to access larger markets. There are countries
like Mexico that produce a wide range of protected works, and this
mechanism can serve as an incentive to enter the U.S. market where
there are many Spanish speakers. This could be an inducement to
promote the creation of copyrighted works. In fact, the Mexican
entertainment industry is considered the major producer of television
265
programs in Spanish around the globe.
However, this is unlikely to
occur based on experiences like the TRIPs Agreement or the Berne
Convention, which, by themselves, not only failed to promote the
creation of works, but failed to prevent the pervasive piracy existing in
266
Mexico. The reasons for the great success of the Mexican producers
are not related to copyrights but to other kinds of monopolies.
Therefore, in order to attract net importer countries into the
proposed mechanism, there has to be an economic incentive, even if not
related directly to copyrights. This incentive could broaden the internal
markets of those developed countries that are the biggest exporters of

264. It has been suggested that the TRIPs Agreement and the WTO are “transitional
means for creating domestic self-interest” in enforcing copyrights in developing countries.
See Ronald J.T. Corbett, Protecting and Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights in Developing
Countries, 35 INT’L LAW. 1083, 1103 (2001). The author also suggests that what is needed is
an approach that benefits domestic companies in order to produce internal pressures in local
governments. Id.
265. Grupo Televisa, S.A. de C.V. is considered the major producer of Spanish series
and movies around the world. This is interesting considering that Spain has a larger economy
than Mexico. Compare CIA, The World Factbook, Spain, https://cia.gov/cia/publications/
factbook/geos/sp.html#Econ (last visited Dec. 15, 2006) (stating Spain has an established
GDP (purchasing power parity) of over $1 trillion and a GDP (official exchange rate) of over
$1 trillion), with CIA, The World Factbook, Mexico, https://cia.gov/cia/
publications/factbook/geos/mx.html#Econ (last visited Dec. 15, 2006) (stating that Mexico has
a GDP (purchasing power parity) of over $1 trillion while it has a GDP (official exchange
rate) of $693 billion).
266. See Tuan N. Samahon, TRIPs Copyright Dispute Settlement After the Transition
and Moratorium: Nonviolation and Situation Complaints Against Developing Countries, 31
LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1051, 1054 (2000) (stating that developing countries have strong
incentives to under-enforce copyrights). The author also suggests that the marriage of
international trade and intellectual property was necessary to overcome this underenforcement situation. See id. at 1071–73. I propose to use this mechanism to promote
internal opportunities in developing countries rather than imposing measures. Imposition has
proven helpless.
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copyrighted works. However, this solution seems to force one sector of
the exporters’ economies to pay for the advantages of another sector.
Another alternative could be the copyright holders’ investment in those
developing countries. This investment may create jobs because some of
the operations of copyright holders can be transferred to these copyright
importing countries. A stronger presence in those countries may create
267
more awareness of how copyrights can develop the economy. People
would be more sympathetic to copyright holders. The pervasive piracy
today results because people either do not understand the economic
advantages of copyright law or they think it is a system of unfair
earnings awarded to copyright holders. A greater presence of copyright
holders and the creation of jobs would help people in developing
countries learn how copyrights work and would change their
perspectives about copyrights. The software, phonogram, and movie
industries sometimes create unwitting development in developing
countries. Another alternative could be that major copyright holders
sponsor universities in their research activities with sizeable grants or
award scholarships in developing countries. However, there is a risk of
not creating economic development but only increasing copyright
holders’ revenues:
[B]roadening copyright generates no real economic growth, it
increases the price . . . consumers must pay for copyrighted
works and transfers those additional revenues to copyright
producers. Broadening copyright can thereby generate a real
increase in revenue, and consequently GDP share, for the
copyright industries even if it generates no real economic
268
growth.
The internal process by which participant countries can withdraw
from the enforcement mechanism could be biased by the lobbying
power of copyright holders. Therefore, those countries would be at risk
of not receiving any economic advantage and still be tied to the
proposed mechanism:
Taken together, the advantages available to copyright owners in
the political and legal battles over copyright’s scope do not mean
that copyright owners will win every battle over copyright’s

267. For an economic analysis of how increasing intellectual property protection affects
developing countries, see Evelyn Su, The Winners and the Losers: The Agreement of TradeRelated Aspects on Intellectual Property Rights and Its Effects on Developing Countries, 23
HOUS. J. INT’L L. 169 (2000).
268. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private
Copying, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 899 (2001).
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expansion. Even with their disadvantages, consumers may on
occasion rise up and defeat proposals for broader protection.
Nevertheless, these advantages mean that copyright owners will
win more such battles than they should. Whatever occasional
defeats for broader protection occur will likely prove only
temporary setbacks, and the disproportionate influence of
copyright owners should prove decisive over the long run. A
process biased in favor of overbroad protection will lead, sooner
or later, to a similarly biased result. For that reason, traditional
political avenues of opposition to copyright’s evolution from
public interest to private interest will likely fail. If copyright has
not yet been fully captured by the industry it is supposed to
269
regulate, it is only a matter of time.
Consequently, there should be strong surveillance work by the
copyright importing countries in order to balance the economic benefits
they will receive from the copyright holders to determine if those
benefits are real and practicable and to not be overwhelmed by the
powerful copyright industry of developed countries.
In any case, in the negotiation process, developing countries may
exclude some defendants from the mechanism, like twelve-year-old
children or college students who engage in peer-to-peer activities.
Otherwise, an environment of fear would lead to the rejection of the use
of technology in developing countries. The proposal here is to use the
mechanism only against distributors of peer-to-peer technology. The
rationale for avoiding enforcing this mechanism against a few million
users of peer-to-peer technology is based not only on practical
reasons—because it is impossible to sue them all—but is also a question
of social justice. It would be unacceptable to subject an ordinary citizen
or a child to the jurisdiction of a foreign court applying excessively
higher standards of protection. The mechanism is designed for ISPs or
distributors of peer-to-peer technology engaged in infringing activities;
however, those activities are defined by the applicable law accepted by
the mechanism. If these entrepreneurs are making money through their
infringing activities or if they receive other advantages from these
activities, then they must pay the consequences. Nonetheless, private
individuals engaged in such activity are probably not aware that they are
individually causing such a great loss to the copyright owners.
With this proposed mechanism, it is highly probable that the income
of Mexican ISPs would decrease. However, I do not see a problem with

269. Id. at 907 (footnote omitted).

BARBOSA ARTICLE

146 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:1

this outcome. According to Forbes, the major stockholder of Mexico’s
270
largest ISP—Telmex—is the fourth richest man in the world. This is a
shocking truth considering that almost half of the Mexican population
lives in extreme poverty. Other highly unregulated Mexican ISPs offer
expensive services and low quality standards. The proposed mechanism
would push them into lobbying processes and public hearings, which
could be better than how those unregulated businesses are run today.
The last resource to deal with this problem is to trust in enforcing
judges that are going to review if the foreign judgment is in accordance
with their national public policy. As mentioned earlier, if the choice of
law was arbitrary or unreasonable, the judgment would turn against the
public policy of the place where the enforcement is sought. Then it
would be unenforceable. The key question I propose is whether the
issuing court will properly assess the place of infringement in order to
determine the applicable law.
A ground for non-recognition based on public policy may be
controversial because it could be interpreted broadly. However, under
the proposed mechanism, it is highly recommended that this ground for
non-recognition would be limited to the proper choice of law and to
public policies reflected in each constitutional text. It should not be an
excuse to review the foreign judgment under the eyes of national
copyright law.
CONCLUSION
Copyright and neighboring rights exist because there is a public
purpose behind them. This public purpose is derived from the will of
271
each country’s legislature to promote the creation of useful works.
270. See Forbes.com: Forbes World’s Richest People 2005, http://www.forbes.com/
static/bill2005/LIRWYDJ.html?passListId=10&passYear=2005&passListType=Person&uniq
ueId=WYDJ&datatype=Person (last visited Dec. 20, 2006). Telmex ISP has signed up
600,000 broadband Internet subscribers in the last year. Id.
271. The most important philosophical approaches or normative justifications for
copyright law are: instrumentalism or utilitarianism, natural rights based principally on
Locke, and moral rights based on Kant and Hegel. Both utilitarian and natural rights
justifications are present mostly in the United States and other legal systems belonging
principally to the common law tradition. Moral rights normative justifications are mostly
present in civil law tradition systems. While one justification or another may predominate in
any particular state, other justifications remain influential. See Justin Hughes, The
Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO L.J. 287, 288–90 (1988); Jason Lloyd, Note, Let
There Be Justice: A Thomistic Assessment of Utilitarianism and Libertarianism, 8 TEX. REV.
L. & POL. 229, 255–56 (2003). For an analysis of Locke’s natural justification for private
property and its application to copyrights, see Benjamin G. Damstedt, Note, Limiting Locke:
A Natural Law Justification for the Fair Use Doctrine, 112 YALE L.J. 1179, 1184–96 (2003).
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For the purposes of this Article, it has been assumed that this is the best
justification for copyright law. However, the proposed mechanism is
applicable whatever normative justification is taken.
The territorial nature of copyrights has led to the development of
international treaties containing national treatment principles and
minimum standards of protection. Those international treaties were
written, not because there is a natural universal copyright, but because
those conventions were useful for achieving the basic principle and
purpose of copyright: the promotion of new works. By protecting
foreign works, Member States promote the creation of new works
because local authors do not have to compete with cheaper unprotected
foreign works. The harmonization through international treaties has
done most of the work needed to establish effective copyright
protection. However, the most important efforts of harmonization were
done before the digital age. The legal development now needs to
overcome procedural problems caused by new technology to copyright
holders—necessitating the improvement of international litigation.
The barrier of physical distance between countries has been broken
with the digital age. A mechanism is necessary that is based on
established principles that can now be applied to the new problems
created by technology. Even though this proposal offers three paths, in
case the first and most important fails, the core of the proposal is an
international treaty for the enforcement of copyright judgments.

See also Barbara Friedman, Note, From Deontology to Dialogue: The Cultural Consequences
of Copyright, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 157, 160–67 (1994). For an analysis of civil law
tradition normative justifications and their influence on civil law tradition statutes, see Neil
Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy in United States
and Continental Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 13–23 (1994). The public
purpose behind utilitarian normative justification is the best fit for the proposed mechanism.
However, it could work in any legal system having any normative justification for copyrights.

